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7.1  Introduction 
The United  States has been the world leader in agricultural tech- 
nology and the dominant factor in world grain markets. Between 1970 
and 1980 the value of  U.S. agricultural exports more than doubled in 
real terms, with the real value of grain exports more than tripling. Yet 
by  1986 the export and net trade positions had returned almost to the 
1970 levels (table 7.1). What happened? 
During the 1980s the following additional and interrelated events have 
caused concern about the U.S. farm economy: market prices of the 
grains have fallen about 30 percent (nominal) between 1980 and 1986; 
the average price of farmland has fallen 21  percent during the period; 
perhaps  150,000 commercial-scale farms, 20 percent of the total, are 
under severe financial stress; U.S. farm commodity programs in the 
1980s were larger and more costly than ever before in real terms, even 
than in the 1930s and 1950s. 
This paper assesses the available explanations of the decline in ag- 
ricultural exports, the possible policy responses to the situation, and 
prospects for the near future. 
Some leading hypotheses explaining weakness in the foreign market 
for U.S.  farm products are (1) expansion of world agricultural output 
abroad; (2) declining (rate of  increase of) demand in the developing 
countries; (3) macroeconomic or financial factors, notably a rise in the 
foreign exchange value of the dollar and weakened import demand due 
to events  associated  with  the  “debt  crisis”  in  many  countries; (4) 424  Bruce L. Gardner/H. B. Atwater, JrJJohn R. Block 
Table 7.1  U.S. Agricultural Trade (billions of  dollars) 
Exports 
Other  Livestock  Net 


























































































3.8  9.9 
14.6  10.8 
12.1  16.7 
11.8  14.7 
15.5  12.3 
18.3  12.1 
18.2  14.5 
17.3  13.1 
20.2  13.9 
35.7  16.9 
40.5  18.9 
36.9  15.7 
36.4  17.4 
35.0  19.9 
40.7  20.5 
44.1  21.2 
48.1  20.4 
46.0  17.9 
36.6  15.3 
34.8  15.9 
34.9  17.8 
26.5  17.4 
























Source: Council of Economic Advisers. 
Norr: Dollars are deflated  by implicit GNP deflator; 1982 =  100. 
“Wheat, rice, and feed grains. 
bCotton, tobacco, oilseed products. 
CIncludes  commodities not itemized. 
“Author’s estimate based on data through November 1986. 
protectionist policies among industrial-country food importers; and (5) 
U.S. agricultural policies that overprice exported commodities. 
Each hypothesis embodies several more specific causes of reduced 
demand for U.S.  commodities. For example, expansion of world output 
occurs because of improvements in technology in developing countries, 
as in the Green Revolution, or  because countries change their policies, 
as in Indonesia’s promoting of self-sufficiency in rice. Also, some issues 
cut across several of these hypotheses, notably the issue of whether 
the U.S. grain export decline reflects  mainly a deterioration in U.S. 
competitiveness  as  compared to other countries or a worldwide shrink- 
age in commodity demand compared to supplies. To  present the evi- 
dence in an orderly fashion, the discussion is organized as it bears on 
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7.2  World Agricultural Output 
In response to pessimistic appraisals of the prospects for food pro- 
duction in  the developing countries (e.g., U.S. Council on Environ- 
mental Quality 1980; Brandt Commission 1980), several authors have 
pointed to evidence that technical progress in farming is accelerating 
in  many countries (Avery 1984; Sanderson 1984; Johnson  1983). Im- 
pressive recent technical advances have occurred in milk production, 
control of livestock disease (e.g., new vaccine for foot-and-mouth dis- 
ease), improved varieties of traditional crops, and development of non- 
traditional crops that are drought resistant or insensitive to water sa- 
linity. In addition, changes in the agricultural policies of some countries 
have been cited as causing increased output. India’s freer pricing and 
regional trade  and Argentina’s cutting of  grain export taxes are ex- 
amples. The most important case, however, is China, whose agricul- 
tural output is estimated to have increased 31 percent between  1980 
and 1984.’ 
While these and other such episodes provide concrete evidence about 
emerging events, an aggregate account-the  account that really mat- 
ters-requires  combining the well-documented instances of  growth with 
less successful commodities and countries. While the accuracy of mea- 
sured year-to-year output changes is questionable, we have no better 
choice than to base our overall judgment of  world output trends on 
collections of national data, particularly as published by the Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the U.N. 
To see how the pre- and post-1980 data fit in with longer-term trends, 
figures 7.1-7.3  summarize statistics of the recent history of world agri- 
cultural production. The data are given in the appendix in table 7.A.  1. 
Figures 7.1-7.3  are plotted on a semilogarithmic scale so that the slope 
indicates the rate of growth. 
Figure 7.1 shows an index of worldwide aggregate agricultural pro- 
duction, constructed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The index 
grows at a trend rate of 2.3 percent over the 1955-85 period. This rate 
exceeds the world population growth rate, so we should not expect to 
see price rises owing to population-food pressure.  Perhaps less well 
known, in view of the emphasis on droughts and famines in popular 
discussion of agriculture, is the stability of the growth of  output. The 
index never departs from a band  t  4 percent of the trend value, and 
the lowest point relative to trend in recent years, in  1983, is largely 
attributable to the United States idling about 20 percent of its cropland 
under its payment-in-kind (PIK) acreage idling program. 
The most significant point for U.S. exports in the 1980s is lack of 
evidence that the rate of growth of output in the 1980s is different from 
that of the preceding twenty-five years. There have been subperiods 
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and  1968, and this could help  explain the general agricultural price 
weakness of the 1960s. But nothing here explains the price weakness 
of the 1980s. 
To focus more directly on the most discussed source of U.S. farm 
export problems, figure 7.2 shows the production of grains (wheat and 
coarse grains aggregated) outside the United States. The trend rate of 
growth, 3.1 percent annually in  1960-80,  is higher than for all food, 
and grain output is less stable. A band of about 7 percent around trend 
is necessary to encompass all the observations, with output on several 
occasions rising or falling 8 percent to 10 percent within a year. The 
salient fact about the 1980s is that even more clearly than for all agri- 
cultural output, the production of grain outside the United States pro- 
vides no explanation for the weak export market of the 1980s. Indeed, 
if  non-U.S. production were the dominant market force, U.S. exports 
would be greater in the 1980s than in the 1970s. Every observation in 
the 1980s lies below the 1960-80  trend line drawn in these figures. 
Figure 7.3 disaggregates to show developing and industrial countries 
separately. Aggregate agricultural output in  the developing countries 
is growing more rapidly than in the industrial countries, at a trend rate 
of  2.7 percent  annually  in  1955-85  in  the  former  compared  to  1.6 
percent in  the industrial countries. The rate does not  seem to have 
changed appreciably during this period. Although there is an apparent 
acceleration in the late 1960s, the Green Revolution and recent tech- 
nical advances and policy changes have not shifted agricultural output 
in these countries either to a higher output growth rate or to a higher 
base level from which future growth may proceed (i.e., no apparent 
one-time permanent output increases shifting the trend line). The rel- 
atively slow growth of output in the industrial countries has to temper 
(but it does not negate) the notion that output-promoting policies of 
the industrial countries are a prime cause of world price weakness (as 
argued, for example, in World Bank 1986). 
The lack of fluctuation of annual output around trend in developing 
countries as compared to the industrial countries-all  observations of 
developing countries in  1955-85  being within 3 percent  of  the trend 
output-could  reflect data problems.  Statistics on annual changes in 
farm output for some countries are unreliable, and even ex post a year’s 
stated output may be partly a trend extrapolation of the previous year’s 
value. In this sense the observed stability may be a statistical artifact. 
Nonetheless, the maintenance of a steady trend for thirty years must 
surely reflect a real underlying stability in output growth. 
The centrally planned economies also have a substantial 2.5 percent 
annual growth rate of agricultural output over the thirty-year period 
(not shown in figure 7.1  -7.3-data in appendix). This may be surprising 
in view of the recurrent stories of  problems in the agricultural econ- 428  Bruce L. Gardner/H. B. Atwater, JrJJohn R. Block 
omies of these countries. The data for China dominate the aggregate. 
Output in the Soviet Union grew less than 1 percent annually in 1970- 
85. Perhaps more striking than output trends in the centrally planned 
economies, given that we call them  “planned,”  is the variability of 
output around trend. While the world as a whole and the developing 
countries as a group are always within a 4 percent bank around trend 
output in  1955-85,  the centrally planned economies in  aggregate are 
more often than not outside this band. Even for this group, however, 
production in the 1980s is not above the thirty-year trend line. 
7.2. I 
The United States is thought to be an efficient, some say the world’s 
most efficient, agricultural producer, but the evidence for this propo- 
sition is thin. Total factor productivity as an index of aggregate output, 
divided by an index of land, labor, and other inputs, can be revealing, 
but data appropriate for international comparisons are not available. 
Partial productivity  measures,  such as yields per acre or output per 
worker, are available, but must be used with care. For example, in 1982 
Indonesia harvested 2.5 tons of rice per hectare while the U.S.  yield 
was 3.9 tons. But we cannot draw conclusions about productivity with- 
out information about nonland inputs per hectare in the two countries. 
And even if  we could obtain total cost-of-rice comparisons for the two 
countries, we need information about the cost of producing rice relative 
to other goods. 
These difficulties notwithstanding, the most pertinent productivity 
indicators are as follows. The index of total factor productivity in U.S. 
agriculture published by the USDA has a trend rate of growth of  2.0 
percent annually between  1950 and 1985. During the  1980s the index 
has been unusually volatile. It ranged from a low in 1983 of 98 (com- 
pared to a base level of  100 in  1977) to a high of  127 in  1985. The 
index’s average in 1981-85 was 114, compared to 101 in the previous 
five-year period, 1976-80,  implying a 2.5 percent annual productivity 
growth rate. This is above the thirty-five-year trend rate of productivity 
growth, but the volatility of  measured productivity in the 1980s is too 
large to infer that the increase is significant. Still, there is no evidence 
that  U.S.  agricultural  productivity growth is  slackening, and  so no 
reason to suspect declining international competitiveness on this score. 
Cross-country partial productivity comparisons can be made using 
data on grain output per hectare. For the 1960-85  period my estimate 
of the trend rate of growth of wheat and coarse grain yield is 2.4 percent 
annually in  the United  States. For the countries outside the United 
States, as an aggregate the rate of increase in grain yield is 2.6 percent 
for the same period.  So U.S. yields are growing slightly less rapidly. 
But the non-U.S. countries started at a much lower yield level, and in 
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1986 U.S. grain yields at 4.7 tons per hectare are still more than double 
the 2.1 tons yield in the non-U.S. aggregate. Looking at more recent 
trends, the rate of growth in grain yields seems to have slowed slightly 
in  the non-U.S.  countries in  the  1970s, and then accelerated in the 
1980s to about a 3.0 percent annual rate of growth. The United States 
has remained more nearly at a steady 2.4 percent growth rate. The 
year-to-year volatility in yields is such that one cannot be confident 
that the differences between growth rates in different time periods are 
significant. And as the earlier caveats indicate, cross-country compar- 
isons of yields are dubious indicators of productivity because they omit 
nonland inputs from the accounting.  But such as they are, the grain 
yield data provide no cause for worry about a loss of US. competi- 
tiveness in agriculture. 
Another approach to competitiveness is to compare the export price 
of competing commodities from different countries, as in the indexes 
of  price competitiveness of  Kravis and Lipsey (1971, 44). The U.S. 
Department of Agriculture estimates that in June 1986, when the U.S. 
Gulf Coast price of  no. 2 hard red winter wheat averaged $2.94 per 
bushel, the most nearly comparable Argentine wheat price was $2.32, 
while Canadian and Australian wheat was selling from $2.40 to $2.70 
per bushel. Moreover, since 1981 the price of  Argentinian wheat de- 
clined from a 7 percent premium over the U.S. Gulf price to the 21 
percent discount as of June 1986. The USDA attributes lagging U.S. 
wheat  sales to these differences, which in  their calculations persist 
after accounting for transportation cost and quality differences (U .S. 
Department of Agriculture 1986a, 2). 
The significance of  such price differentials is unclear; in particular, 
it is unclear whether they say anything about competitiveness. Neither 
of the two plausible views about the nature of the world wheat market 
permits a straightforward measure of  competitiveness using the price 
differences. One view is that (quality-adjusted) wheat is essentially a 
homogeneous good. In exporting grain, international grain-trading com- 
panies  such as Cargill, Continental, and others compete for sales to 
importers by  acquiring grain interchangeably  from  that  available at 
various exporting locations, according to which is cheapest at the mo- 
ment.  Their joint bidding and action establishes something close to 
competitive  pricing  structure in  which  expoyt prices fmm different 
countries differ only because of locational or quality advantages. The 
price ratios then are uninformative about countries’ relative production 
costs or competitiveness. 
Still, price ratios of grain from different countries change over time 
in ways that cannot readily be explained by changes in marketing costs, 
as in  the Argentina wheat  case cited above, and these changes are 
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1986~).  A  view  that explains such  observations is  that wheat from 
different countries is a different commodity, not just quality-adjusted 
versions of the same commodity, so, for example, demand shifts can 
change what counts as “high-quality”  wheat. For example, some wheats 
are good for spaghetti, others for bread; which kind sells at a premium 
to the other depends on relative  supply of and demand for the two 
types. Since exporting countries produce different proportions of dif- 
ferent types, they are selling different or at least differentiated products. 
Grennes, Johnson, and Thursby (1978) develop the argument that the 
world wheat market is like this. In this situation, we can speak of U.S. 
wheat becoming more or less competitive with imperfectly substitut- 
able wheat from other countries and look at changing relative prices 
of wheat from different countries to measure competitiveness. 
The most conclusive evidence that the United States is efficient or 
competitive in agriculture has been its dominance of the export mar- 
kets. But now that dominance is slipping. U.S. farm output grew 1.9 
percent annually  in  1955-85  and  1.8 percent in  1970-85.  Since the 
agricultural output of the developing countries-indeed  that of the non- 
United States generally-grew  at a faster rate while all countries faced 
the same world market prices, can we conclude that the United States 
is becoming less competitive in agriculture?  No. Most countries insulate 
their domestic producer prices from world prices, and differential trends 
have occurred in the degree of protection. Some developing countries 
have moved from taxing their agricultures (paying producers less than 
world prices) to subsidizing them by paying more. 
Such changes in policy could explain the decline in the U.S. share 
of  world  agricultural production that is  implied by  the slower U.S. 
output growth rate. But our knowledge of the effects of these policies 
is not sufficient to determine if  this hypothesis explains the facts. Al- 
ternative hypotheses involve changes in factor supplies4hanging trade 
patterns as some countries increase their ratio of farmland to labor, or 
farmland to other resources, by clearing  jungles, constructing irrigation 
projects, and the like. But again our knowledge is too sketchy to draw 
conclusions. 
A problem with any numerical indicator of efficiency or competi- 
tiveness is that the indicator may change as supply and demand con- 
ditions change. For example, the U.S. corn belt could well be the most 
efficient supplier of corn to the world market-the  supply activity in- 
cluding both producing  the crop and getting it shipped to importing 
locations-in  the sense that as world prices fall low enough to squeeze 
out corn suppliers, the corn belt would stay in business at the lowest 
world prices. But at the current level of production, the U.S. marginal 
cost is at the higher levels that prevail in other regions. An indicator 
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competitiveness. As this example suggests, however, the real issue is 
not any overall indicator of competitiveness, but rather changes in the 
demand  for and  supply of  the exported commodities in  the United 
States and elsewhere. 
7.3  World Food Demand 
One of the principal recurring reasons for optimism about increasing 
demand for U.S. agricultural commodities has been pessimism about 
world population growth confronting limited food production capacity. 
Increasing scarcity of food would in this scenario result in an increasing 
real price of agricultural commodities, and of land as a specific factor 
in agriculture, and thus real gains to food-exporting countries. In fact, 
real prices of agricultural commodities for which long-time series are 
available, such as wheat or sugar from colonial times to the present, 
show a persistent downward trend. For grains in the twentieth century 
the trend rate of price decline is about one percent annually, so real 
prices have declined by little more than one-half since 1900. The main 
reasons seem to be technical change in food production and marketing, 
together with a failure of  demand to grow fast enough  to pressure 
specific factors in agriculture. 
Notwithstanding the long-term trend, the sharp price rises of  agri- 
cultural commodities in the 1970s rekindled worries about global food 
scarcity. Evidence of this worry is contained not only in alarming arti- 
cles, but also in  speculative commodity price rises and increases in 
agricultural land prices. Between 1970 and 1980, U.S. crop prices re- 
ceived by farmers increased by  17  percent in real terms. During this 
same period the USDA's farm real estate price index rose 52 percent 
in real terms. The land price increases were large enough that they 
must have embodied expectations that high rental returns would persist 
or continue to increase for many years.2 
The preceding section indicates that the failure of these expectations 
to be realized in  1982-86  is not attributable to a detectable surge in 
world food output. The natural alternative cause to look for is a decline 
(relative to other commodities) in world food demand. The two main 
possibilities for a decline from earlier expectations in demand involve 
the rate of population growth and the rate of consumer income growth. 
Population has not grown as fast in the 1980s as forecast in some 
earlier projections, but it is still positive enough to add significantly to 
food demand each year. The U.S.  Department of Agriculture publishes 
an index of food output per capita (fig. 7.4) that indicates world food 
demand pressure on available supplies. The rate of growth of agricul- 
tural output  per  capita over the  1955-85  period  is one-half of  one 
percent annually for the world as a whole; the same rate (to the nearest 432  Bruce L. GardnedH. B. Atwater, Jr./John R. Block 
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tenth of one percent) is found for the developing countries. Both time 
series look as if a constant-rate-of-growth trend line would fit well, but 
there are statistically significant departures from a constant trend. The 
least-squares trend lines for both the developing and whole world are 
drawn in figure 7.4 as estimated, using 1955-70 as the sample period. 
The post-1975 data depart significantly from this trend line. For the 
world as a whole, every observation after  1975 lies below the trend 
line-agricultural  output is increasing faster than population, but not 
at as fast a rate in 1975-85  as in  1955-70.  On the other hand, in the 
developing countries no observation after  1975 lies below the trend 
line. Thus, comparing figure 7.4 with figure 7.1-7.3  shows that the 
period of  the Green Revolution and after experienced a lessening of 
food-population pressure in these countries because population grew 
slower, rather than because output grew faster. 
Although the data show no trend toward an expanding necessity for 
agricultural imports prior to  1980, or a reduction in  such necessity 
since, there is evidence that the demand for food imports rose through 
the 1970s and declined in the 1980s. Table 7.2 shows relevant data for 
some important regions. Africa, Asia, and Latin America all have been 
increasing their net imports of grains, at least up to 1980, in quantities 
that are unlikely to be caused by movements along a demand curve as 
real prices  fell. Indeed, in  1973 and  1980, prices  were high and yet 
imports were highest in these years. Therefore, the demand for imports 
must be increasing. Why? Having cast doubt on population-food supply 
pressure, the likely candidate is real income. 433  International Competition in Agriculture and U.S.  Farm Policy 
Table  7.2  AMU~  Net Imports of Grain (million metric tons) 
East Europe 
Latin  and  Western 
Date  Africa  Asia  America  USSR  Europe 
1948  -52  0  6  -1  no data  22 
1960  -2  17  0  0  25 
1966  7  34  -5  4  27 
1973  -74  6  45  2  18  20 
1980  18  64  16  43  11 
1985  46  14  1  32  -  16 
Sources:  1948-80:  Development,  1982:4, p. 5; 1985: U.S. Department of  Agriculture 
1986b. 
Although the demand for food products in  the industrial countries 
does not increase as much as income increases, perhaps  1 percent to 
3 percent for each 10 percent increase in real income, the demand for 
food is more responsive to income in the developing countries, typi- 
cally, 6 percent to 7 percent for each 10 percent income increase (see 
Ritson  1982, 34, for summary of estimates). Nonfood commodities as 
an aggregate must have an even higher income elasticity if that for food 
commodities is less than one, so the income growth scenario is con- 
sistent with a declining relative price of food. Still, the empirical evi- 
dence is that income growth is associated with increased food imports. 
The key factor in grain import demand for some rapidly growing econ- 
omies is the switch from food to feed use of these commodities as the 
demand for meat increases. Mellor and Johnston (1984) cite the case 
of Taiwan, where feed use of cereals rose from 1 percent to 60 percent 
of total use between  1961 and 1981. 
Thus, the most plausible reason for increases in cereal imports by 
developing countries despite rising output per capita is increasing real 
income in these countries. Projecting increased per capita income into 
the future leads to quite substantial increases in projected imports by 
developing countries. For example, a report by Winrock International 
(1983, 42) projects cereal imports of  152 million metric tons by Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America in 1993. A recent study by the U.S. Depart- 
ment of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service projects an increase 
of 40 million metric tons in grain imports by the developing countries 
during the  1980s (White, Mathia, and Overton 1986, 143). However, 
the  1985  data of  table 7.2 are not  on the paths to these outcomes. 
Except in Africa, imports have decreased substantially in the 1980s. 
What happened? Since real income growth is credited with causing 
agricultural imports to rise until 1980, perhaps real income per capita 
has  stopped growing in  the developing countries.  The World  Bank 
estimates that real GDP per capita in the developing countries as a 434  Bruce L. Gardner/H. B. Atwater, JrJJohn R. Block 
group increased  at an annual rate of 3.2 percent in  1973-80  and  1.3 
percent in  1980-85  (World Bank 1986, 45). This decline seems small, 
but it could have had a significant effect because the market for traded 
grains is thin. The developing countries produce about four-fifths of 
the grains and over 95 percent of the rice they consume. If the rate of 
growth of demand fell by 1 percent, while the rate of growth of output 
continued to rise at almost 3 percent per year, it is not hard to accu- 
mulate a 20 percent to 30 percent reduction in excess demand over five 
years. Suppose the decline in the rate of  GNP growth of  1.9 percent 
(from 3.2 to 1.3) caused a decline in the rate of food demand growth 
of  1 percent (income elasticity of 3,  from 2.5 percent to 1.5 percent 
per year. With output growing at 2.7 percent per year, excess demand 
decreases by  1.2 percent of consumption each year. This 1.2 percent 
is about  5  percent of quantities imported.  If  this occurs every year 
between 1981 and 1986, we accumulate a 25 percent reduction in aggre- 
gate food import demand. 
The slow-income-growth explanation does not, at first glance, fit well 
with less aggregated data for the developing countries. Low-income 
countries in Asia had faster-growing real GNP in 1980-85 than in 1973- 
80, yet their agricultural imports declined most, as seen in table 7.2. 
Low-income countries in Africa had a 2 percent annual decline in per 
capita real GNP in 1980-85, yet their cereal imports increased. These 
apparent anomalies are explained by concurrent changes in other de- 
terminants of  demand growth. In Asia, because of  technical change, 
increased price incentives for producers, and decreasing rates of pop- 
ulation growth, increases in  supply outpaced the growth of  demand; 
some Asian countries achieved self-sufficiency in cereals, particularly 
rice.  In Africa, the income decline was accompanied by, and indeed 
was in part caused by, slumping growth in agricultural output. And the 
population growth rate remained high. Between 1974-76 and 1982-84, 
food production per capita declined by more than 10 percent in Somalia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, South Af- 
rica, Cameroon, and Botswanna (World Bank 1986, 190). The potential 
for increased import demand was realized without the income growth 
normally required, in part because of  increased food aid  shipments, 
which count as imports. 
Several  recent  papers  have  argued  that  an  important  cause  of 
developing-country import increases in the 1970s was cheap (negative 
real interest rate) credit plentifully supplied by the industrial countries. 
Then the “debt crisis”  of the 1980s turned this situation on its head 
and caused import demand to weaken (see White, Mathia, and Overton 
1986, 128; Insel 1986; Watkins and Galston 1986). A helpful review of 
arguments and  evidence on this  hypothesis  is provided  in  Dutton, 
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There seems to be no clear a priori reason for debt to be strongly 
associated with food imports. Nonetheless, there is an empirical linkage 
between decline in growth of debt and declining agricultural imports 
in the 1980s. Dutton, Grennes, and Johnson estimate that for a set of 
debtor countries that bought U.S. farm products in 1972-84,  each $1 
billion in annual net financial inflow induced $400 million in agricultural 
imports. 
7.4  Macroeconomic and International Financial Policies 
Monetary and fiscal policies in both the United  States and abroad 
have been linked to the export performance of U.S. agrculture. To the 
extent that these policies influence real income growth or debt, they 
affect the demand for imports as discussed in the preceding section. 
The macroeconomic effects that have received most attention, how- 
ever, are the consequences of  changes in exchange rates. A recent 
assessment by  the World  Bank  (1986, chap.  4) finds exchange rate 
overvaluation to be one of the principal sources of  a bias against agri- 
culture that is widespread among developing countries. The bias works 
against agriculture mainly because many of the overvaluing countries 
are traditional agricultural exporters; by overpricing their currencies 
they overprice their commodities from the viewpoint of foreign buyers. 
While movements in real exchange rates track agricultural exports quite 
well-the  World Bank summarizes studies of Nigeria, Ghana, Argen- 
tina, and Brazil-the  direction of the changes has been mixed.  The 
African countries have been losing export markets and the Latin Amer- 
ican countries gaining. 
With respect to U.S. exchange rates, three events concerning the 
value of  the dollar have received much emphasis: the fall in the dollar 
in the early 1970s, the rise in 1980-85,  and the decline since the first 
quarter of 1985. 
The importance  of  the depreciation of  the dollar for encouraging 
U.S. agricultural exports during the period when the flexible exchange 
rate  regime was  introduced has been  emphasized by  Schuh (1975). 
Subsequent  empirical work, notably  by  Chambers  and Just  (1981), 
confirmed the importance of exchange rate movements. They estimated 
that  in  1969-77,  each  1 percent  decline in the value  of  the dollar, 
measured as the exchange rate of dollars for SDRs, caused exports of 
wheat, corn, and soybeans to rise 0.7 percent to 4.1 percent (depending 
on the commodity and whether a short-run or long-run adjustment). 
Orden (1984) attempts to distinguish the effects of exchange rates on 
U.S. corn exports from effects of standard supply and demand variables 
such as yields and foreign income, using 1970-80  data. He finds that 
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export quantities in the early 1970s, during the shift in exchange rate 
regimes, but less in the late 1970s as compared to the standard supply- 
demand variables. 
Assessment of  the relative  importance of  these causal factors re- 
quires an econometric model incorporating them. Three approaches to 
such modeling are (1)  estimation of particular structural relationships 
between putative causal variables and trade flows, for example, Cham- 
bers and Just’s (1981) examination of  the effect of  the exchange rate 
on grain exports; (2) reduced form equations in which trade flows are 
explained  by  a list  of  variables  assumed to be  exogenous,  without 
attempting to model the structural mechanisms that relate subsets of 
endogenous or exogenous variables to one another, for example, Dut- 
ton, Grennes, and Johnson (1986); (3) multivariate time series analyses 
of trade and related variables, attempting to deduce by leads and lags 
which variables cause which, for example, Chambers (1981), and Orden 
(1984). 
The third approach can be viewed as a preliminary exploration that 
should be undertaken before trying either of the other two. Chambers 
(1981) found that the money supply influenced agricultural trade, but 
that a null hypothesis that interest rates influenced trade could not be 
rejected. Batten and Belongia (1986) found that while the real exchange 
rate influenced agricultural exports, they could not find any influence 
of  monetary policy on the real exchange rate in  the  1980s (through 
1984:3), the particular period we are most interested in. No investi- 
gators have reported significant effects of agricultural sector variables 
on macroeconomic variables such as interest rates or GNP growth in 
recent years, although such effects were found in  1970s. While large 
price shocks emanating from commodity markets or policies can un- 
doubtedly influence the overall economy-and  even more so the mea- 
surement of GNP-account effects, as discussed by Tatom (1986)-per- 
sistent effects do not show up in time series data. Consequently there 
is some warrant for proceeding, as most investigators have proceeded, 
by  taking macroeconomic  variables  as exogenous to agriculture and 
estimating reduced-form or structural relationships in approach (2) or 
(1). 
The particular relationships of interest involve effects of  exchange 
rates, foreign income and debt, non-U.S. production, and other coun- 
tries’ policies on the demand for U.S. agricultural commodities. The 
empirical work indicates great difficulty pinning down the effects. Re- 
sults are sensitive to ways variables  are measured (which exchange 
rate, which money supply), specification of estimating equation (vari- 
ables excluded and econometric technique), and data period covered. 
The last is particularly important in limiting the usefulness of  earlier 
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(Orden 1984). This situation is disappointing but not surprising, given 
the large range of estimated parameters for even the much-investigated 
domestic commodity supply and demand elasticities, not to mention 
the elasticity of demand for U.S.  farm exports (see Gardiner and Dixit 
1986). 
Although econometric studies of exchange rates and agricultural ex- 
ports concentrating on data of the 1980s are lacking, the results of work 
on earlier periods reinforce the presumption that the rise of the dollar 
in 1980-84 must have been an important factor in the weakening market 
for U.S.  exports (see Schuh 1985). Relevant data for the grain markets 
are shown in table 7.3. Between 1980 and 1984 the real trade-weighted 
dollar index of the Federal Reserve Board rose by 41 percent (from 
84.8 to 128.5), while grain export quantities fell by 15 percent from 11  1 
million to 95 million tons. However, the big drop in exports did not 
occur until 1985, when the real trade-weighted dollar rose only 3 percent. 
Short-term relationships  are difficult to isolate in the annual data 
because of  lags between price changes as perceived by importers and 
the induced shipments of U.S. grain. Also, the annual data show the 
exchange rate on a calendar-year basis but exports on a marketing- 
year basis, for example, 1985-86  wheat exports as shipments of the 
crop harvested in  1985, and shipped between June 1, 1985, and May 
Table 7.3  U.S. Grain Exports and the Value of the Dollar 
Trade-Weighted 
Marketing  Exports  Dollar, Real 
Year  (million metric tons)  (FRW 
1970-71  38.5 
1971-72  40.5 
1972 -  73  69.1 
1973-74  73.8  98.8 
1974-75  63.6  99.2 
1975-76  82.0  93.9 
1976-77  76.5  97.3 
1977-78  86.9  93.1 
1978-79  92.7  84.2 
1979-80  108.8  83.2 
1980-81  110.7  84.8 
1981-82  108.0  100.8 
1982-83  116.4  111.7 
1983  -84  95.5  117.3 
1984-85  95.4  128.5 
1985-86  61.0  132.0 
1986- 87'  74.6 
~ 
Sources: U.S. Department of  Agriculture; Council of Economic Advisers. 
"Forecast by U.S. Department of Agriculture, December 1986. 438  Bruce L. Gardner/H. B. Atwater, Jr./John R. Block 
31, 1986. Thus, the value of  132.0 for the value of the dollar corre- 
sponding to exports in  1985-86  is the calendar-year 1985 value. This 
seems roughly appropriate since even though much grain harvested in 
1985 is shipped in  1986, the contracting for these shipments is done 
largely in 1985. Still, because the extent and length of time in advance 
that is typical of  forward sales vary, and because on average there 
appear to be one- or two-quarter lags between price changes and ex- 
ports, it is possible that the export decline in 1985-86 reflects in part 
earlier rises in the value of the dollar. 
Dunmore and Longmire (1984) attempt a synthesis of existing evi- 
dence to explain the relative  importance of  the following factors as 
causes of declining U.S.  exports of grains and oilseeds in  1980-83: the 
change in production of these commodities outside the United States, 
the change in population and real per capita income abroad, the ex- 
change rate between the importing countries’ currencies and the dollar, 
purchase decisions by the Soviet Union, the EC’s policy-determined 
exports, changes in freight rates, and the debt situation in importing 
countries.  Dunmore  and  Longmire  find  foreign production  and  ex- 
change rate movements to be the most important short-term contrib- 
utors to the weakening export market  in  1980-82.  From the earlier 
discussion, the picture looks somewhat different for the longer-term 
comparison of the mid-1970s with the mid-1980s. Foreign production 
is less important, real income growth more important. 
Haley  and  Krissoff (1986) estimate the effect of  the value of  the 
dollar on U.S. wheat exports during  1973-85.  They improve on the 
work cited  earlier by  using multicountry  real exchange rate indexes 
weighted by each county’s share of  the world wheat market.  Their 
inflation-adjusted index of  the dollar’s value compared to currencies 
of wheat importers rose 46 percent between 1979 and 1985, and their 
index for competing wheat exports rose 43 per~ent.~  This is somewhat 
less than the increase of 59 percent in the real FRB index of table 7.3, 
but all the indexes track fairly closely in the 1980s. They estimate that 
a 1 percent permanent increase in  the exchange rate reduces wheat 
export quantity by 2.5 percent over a period of eleven quarters, with 
essentially no effect until the fifth quarter after an exchange rate change. 
Given the evidence for 1980-84, it is disappointing that there appears 
to have been no appreciable response of  quantities exported to the 
decline in the value of  the nominal FRB trade-weighted  dollar index 
from a peak of  156 in  the first quarter of  1985 to 124 in the second 
quarter of 1986, a fall of 23 percent. This could be a matter of lagged 
effects, but even a six-quarter lag should be showing more results than 
so far observed in the grains. The lack of effect is more surprising in 
that a principal difference between U.S.  grain markets of the 1980s and 
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by stock accumulation at support prices in the 1980s. There should be 
more pronounced export quantity response to exchange rates under 
1980s conditions. A shift in foreign demand for U.S. commodities has 
a bigger quantity effect and a smaller price effect when the supply of 
marketed quantities out of stocks is very elastic at the support level. 
The best explanation for the apparent lack of effect of the dollar’s 
fall to date is that while the trade-weighted dollar has fallen, the dollar 
has not fallen against our principal market-oriented export competi- 
tors-Canada,  Australia, and Argentina (Dutton and Grennes 1985)- 
or against developing country importers; the countries in Europe and 
Japan against which the dollar has fallen have effective quantity limits 
on imports and insulate their domestic producer and consumer prices. 
So all the falling dollar does is to increase the border protection nec- 
essary to maintain the internal price and the size of export subsidies 
required  to  meet  U.S.  competition for EC exports in  third-country 
markets. The demand for imports is essentially unresponsive to lower 
prices offered on world markets. To  consider carefully the policy op- 
tions for dealing with this situation requires prior discussion of  farm 
policies, both abroad and in the United States. 
7.5  Agricultural Policies Abroad 
The U.S. position in agricultural trade has undoubtedly been harmed 
by the agricultural policies of importers and competing exporters. Not 
all countries have increased their protection of agriculture in the 1980s, 
however; in these instances they cannot be blamed for the problems 
of recent years. Japan has achieved self-sufficiency in rice by paying 
producers and charging consumers three to five times the world price, 
and has set severe limitations on imports of other agricultural products. 
This policy has been unchanged in the 1980s, but maintaining internal 
prices has caused border protection to increase as world prices fell. 
The more damaging change among industrialized-country importers 
has been that of the European community. The EC has converted itself 
from a net importer of  10 million (metric) tons of grain in  1975 to an 
exporter of  16  million tons in 1985. The internal price has been kept 
at about the same level relative to the world level over time, via variable 
levies on imports, but production at the supported price has increased 
so much that a substantial surplus over EC consumption occurs. This 
is disposed of on world markets via export subsidies. Thus, the mid- 
1980s world prices of grains are lower than they would be without EC 
agricultural protection. The policy-induced net export volume of about 
20 million tons amounts to about 1.5 percent of annual world wheat 
and feed grain production (10-15  percent of world grain trade), which 
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given the inelastic aggregate world non-EC demand and supply func- 
tions typically estimated for grains. 
Developing-country  importers and  exporters  of  grains  have  also 
changed  their policies in  the  1970s and  1980s in  such a way  as to 
encourage production and thus reduce the market for U.S. grain. In 
some cases, notably for rice in China, Indonesia, and Thailand, policies 
that formerly  held farm prices  down were replaced by policies that 
increased farm prices, in some cases providing effective net protection 
by  subsidizing inputs, particularly fertilizer.  This probably  explains 
part of  the reduction in Asian grain imports between 1980 and 1985. 
Nonetheless, as discussed with reference to figure 7.1-7.3,  there has 
been no evident acceleration in agricultural output growth in the devel- 
oping countries as a whole. Therefore, unlike the case of the EC, there 
is no good reason to blame developing-country farm or trade policies 
for the decline in the market for U.S. grains in the 1980s as compared 
to the 1970s. 
Among competing exporters, Brazil in  soybeans and Argentina in 
grains made substantial inroads in  world markets in the  1970s. The 
industrial-country grain exporters, Canada and Australia, have main- 
tained fairly low levels of intervention in the form of maintaining slightly 
higher domestic prices than export prices, but have not made significant 
changes in the 1980s. 
The overall picture consists of two parts: the effects of policies on 
world agricultural commodity trade; and the effects of  policies that 
reduce the U.S. share of the export market. On the first aspect, Tyers 
and Anderson (1986) provide simulations of  the consequences for all 
OECD countries, all developing countries, and both groups together 
when they abandon their border distortions in seven commodity mar- 
kets: wheat, rice, feed grains, beef, pork and chicken, dairy products, 
and sugar. Tyers and Anderson use supply and demand equations for 
each commodity, including cross-price effects, for thirty countries and 
regions. They assume removal of policy-created  differences between 
world prices and internal prices for each country or region as of 1980- 
82. Some of  their results are given in table 7.4. Liberalization by in- 
dustrial  countries,  developing  countries, or  both  groups jointly  in- 
creases trade  substantially  for all commodities and raises the world 
price for all but rice and poultry. Exporting countries like the United 
States would be gainers, although the price effects as simulated are 
small for grains and sugar. There is a net gain worldwide of $40 billion 
annually. 
With respect to recent changes in the U.S. share of world commodity 
trade, table 7.5 summarizes recent data. The U.S. share has fallen off 
since 1975, mostly because of shifts to the EC. The gains of traditional 
exporters, Canada and Australia, for example, have been smaller. This Table 7.4  Simulated Effects of  Liberalization of Commodity Markets 
(percentage changes) 
Developing  Liberalization 
OECD  Country  in All  Market 



























































Source: Tyers and Anderson  1986. 
Table 7.5  Shares of World Grain Exports (percentage) 
Other 
YeaP  United States  EC-  10  Exportersb 
1960  57  -  42'  45 
I965  58  -  26  43 
1970  50  -  28  51 
1975  66  -9  35 
1980  64  2  34 
1981  61  4  35 
1982  58  6  38 
1983  56  6  40 
1984  52  10  39 
1985  49  10  41 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agriculture Service. 
aYear refers to crop year, e.g.,  1960 is the period of time, July 1960 through June 1961, 
when the 1960 crops were sold. 
bCanada, Australia, Argentina, South Africa, and Thailand. 
=Minus sign indicates share of world imports. 442  Bruce L. Gardner/H. B. Atwater, Jr./John  R. Block 
suggests a greater weight for export subsidies and a lesser weight for 
the value of the dollar in explaining the decline in the U.S. export share 
in the 1980s. 
7.6  U.S. Agricultural Policies 
Wide agreement exists that U.S. farm commodity programs are im- 
portant in determining the U.S. position in world trade, but there is 
much disagreement about what particular policies have done. There is 
even more disagreement about what policies are appropriate in  1987. 
Because of the range of policies for different commodities, the com- 
plexity of some of them, and disagreements about their effects, it is 
difficult to provide a discussion that is complete and comprehensive in 
a small space. This section concentrates on some of the main events 
and programs for key commodities. 
7.6.1  Price Supports 
In trade discussions, European countries argue that U.S. farm pol- 
icies are equivalent to export subsidies in that these policies pay U.S. 
producers more than the world price and increase supplies on world 
markets. The opposite concern was important in  U.S.  farm policy 
discussions  in  1985-that  U.S. farm programs  were supporting the 
world market price and hindering U.S. exports. An extraordinary doc- 
ument (U.S. Department of Agriculture 1985), authored jointly by four 
former secretaries of  agriculture  of  both political  parties, Freeman 
(Kennedy administration),  Hardin (Nixon), Butz (Nixon-Ford), and 
Bergland (Carter), stated that cuts in market price support levels were 
essential to help the United States regain its former competitiveness 
in world markets. An assessment of which view is correct is not as 
straightforward as might be expected because U.S. policies have some 
elements that encourage exports but at the same time have other fea- 
tures that discourage exports. 
Corn Price Support Program 
Consider the price support program for corn. It has three main ele- 
ments: (1) a “loan rate,” or market support price, (2) a “target” price, 
and (3) an acreage reduction program.  These are explained in turn, 
with examples drawn from the program for corn up to 1985. 
Loan rate. The loan rate is not an interest rate but the price at which 
the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) values corn as collateral for 
nonrecourse loans under provisions established by law. Nonrecourse 
means that the CCC must accept corn valued at the loan rate as  payment 
in full, including  interest. The corn loan rate for the  1985 crop was 
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(meaning having the corn in commercial storage or approved on-farm 
bins) and receive a loan of $2,550. If the market price rises above the 
loan rate plus interest charges, the farmer repays the loan and reclaims 
the corn. If not, the farmer turns over the corn to the CCC. Since this 
program guarantees the loan rate (less storage costs), it places a floor 
under the market price at roughly the loan-rate level. Whatever excess 
supply exists at the loan rate ends up in CCC stocks. 
The implication for international trade is that no one is going to sell 
corn for export at less than the market support level. When the United 
States sets its loan rate at above the U.S. border price that would 
prevail in the absence of intervention, corn goes under loan instead of 
being exported. The only reason exports are not choked off completely 
is that as U.S. corn is withdrawn from the world market, world prices 
rise. The United  States is not a small country in the sense of being 
able to sell any quantity at the prevailing world price. Between 1972 
and  1980 the market price of corn was generally above the loan rate. 
But in  1981, market prices fell and CCC stocks began to accumulate 
rapidly, By  the time the 1982 crops were harvested, it was clear that 
CCC stocks of corn were going to approach the levels that had char- 
acterized the  1960s. This situation led to the Payment-in-Kind (PIK) 
Program of  1983, which reduced harvested area by about one-fourth 
of  1982 acreage, drove up prices in the world market, and placed U.S. 
prices well above the loan levels.  Higher prices permitted carryover 
stocks to be reduced from 3.5 billion to 1.0 billion bushels. However, 
support prices  were  not  reduced, and with no PIK in  1984, stocks 
began building up again. By  the fall of  1985, CCC corn stocks were 
projected at 4.0 billion bushels, larger than ever. This realization led 
to the view that loan rates should be cut in the new farm legislation 
being debated in 1985. 
Complications in the loan program are that Congress establishes a 
national loan level or range within which the secretary of  agriculture 
can establish it, but variations from state to state occur, presumably 
reflecting the price surface justified by regional differences in normal 
prices. Also, loan rates are defined for particular grades of the com- 
modity, with discounts or disqualification for lower quality. Moreover, 
to receive the CCC loan, grain must be in approved on-farm storage 
facilities or in  commercial  storage which  the  farmer must pay  for. 
Therefore, particularly in the immediate postharvest period, the U .S. 
average farm price can fall well below the loan rate. For example, in 
November 1985 the average price received by farmers was estimated 
by the USDA to be $2.20 per bushel, even though the loan rate was 
$2.55 and there was no lack of corn eligible for the loan program. Thus 
the price floor is somewhat spongy. The average price for the 1985-86 
crop year (September 1-August  31) was $2.35,20 cents below the loan 
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Target price. The target price is a support level for producer receipts 
but not for the market price. Producers receive deficiency payments 
equal to the difference between the target price and higher of the loan 
rate or the average farm price for the first five months of the marketing 
year. In 1984 and 1985 the corn target price was $3.03 per bushel, 48 
cents above the $2.55 loan rate. Farmers cannot realize $3.03 on all 
they wish to produce. The net benefits to farmers are reduced by the 
requirement that acreage be idled in order to qualify for payments. 
Acreage reduction. In 1985, program participants had to idle 10 percent 
of  their corn base acreage, a percentage established by the U.S. De- 
partment of  Agriculture.  To  obtain a notion of the cost to farmers, 
suppose land yields 140 bushels per acre and has an annual rental value 
of  $100 per acre, or $.71 per bushel. For each bushel that would nor- 
mally have been produced, the participating farmer receives the defi- 
ciency payment  of  $.48 on 0.9 bushel, but has to give up the rental 
value of $.71 on idled land that could have produced 0.1 bushel. There- 
fore, the net gain is ($.48 x  .9) -  ($.71 x  .lo) = $.36 per bushel. The 
alternative action, not participating, provides the farmer $2.55, assum- 
ing the market price  is  supported at that  level. The effective  price 
guarantee for a participating farmer is thus $2.55 + .36 = $2.91. 
Complications change the program benefits further. There are com- 
plications that make things better for producers: (1) a farmer may have 
low-quality land to idle, with rent foregone of less than $100 per acre; 
(2) in a special provision for 1985, hay could be harvested from certain 
nominally idled land; (3) a portion of  deficiency payments is paid in 
advance, at planting time, so the farmer gets about six-months interest 
on part of the $.48; (4)  although the regulations proscribe this, if the 
farmer only idles 9 percent rather than 10 percent of the corn base, the 
government will probably not discover the fact, and it is probably also 
safe to grow potatoes or melons, or run cattle on some idled land for 
a short time, even though these activities are not permitted. There are 
also complications that make things worse for producers: (1) the reg- 
ulations require that land be idled, but weeds must be controlled and 
conservation  practices followed; (2) the  farmer may  have fixed  re- 
sources, equipment, and perhaps the farmer’s own labor which will be 
idled along with the land; (3) when the market price on a U.S. average 
annual farm-level basis falls 20  cents below the loan level, the guar- 
anteed price is correspondingly 20 cents below the target price. 
The acreage reduction program’s complications mean that a 10 per- 
cent set-aside does not simply reduce output by  10 percent from the 
no-program output. Although participation generates a net gain in the 
example given above, and does so also for plausible parameter values 
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farmers for whom participation does not pay since only 69 percent of 
corn production was enrolled in the 1985 program. This means actual 
output is reduced by less than 10 percent. Moreover, since we expect 
lower-quality land to be idled, and perhaps even some cheating, output 
will be reduced by less than the 6.9 (10 x  69) percent of the acreage 
base enrolled. Finally, since the payment increases the net incentive 
to produce corn, we expect farmers to try to produce more corn on 
their reduced  acreage by  using more  fertilizer, pesticides,  or other 
measures. So output falls by an even smaller percentage than quality- 
adjusted, truly idled land does. These complications all work in the 
same direction and taken together constitute “slippage.”  Slippage has 
proven difficult to measure beyond  the nonparticipation aspect, but 
the aggregate evidence indicates that in recent years, for both corn and 
wheat, it has been about 30 percent for a given output price (Norton 
1985). That is, the 10 percent corn ARP of  1985, which reduced base 
acreage by 6.9 percent, probably reduced output by (6.9 x  .7) about 
5 percent from what would have been produced on the base acreage. 
What is the effect of all three program elements together? The target 
price protection causes farmers to produce more than they would with 
no price supports, and their excess production drives down world and 
U.S. prices, providing justification for the European complaints. But 
the acreage reductions work  in  the other direction, tending to hold 
world prices up. Which effect dominates? The acreage reductions have 
already been estimated to have reduced corn output by 5 percent from 
what otherwise would have been produced given the price incentive 
that existed. But how much extra production potential was caused by 
target-price protection? 
To  estimate the output effect, two facts are needed:  the producer 
price under the 1985 guarantee compared to the market price that would 
have existed in the absence of the program, and the response of pro- 
duction to higher prices, that is, the elasticity of supply of corn. 
To estimate the market price in the absence of the program, we need 
a judgment about how low prices would have to go to make annual 
U.S. corn production equal domestic consumption plus exports. In the 
1985 crop year, 6.5 billion bushels of corn were marketed, giving an 
indicator of demand. On the supply side, to estimate no-program output 
at trend yields (to abstract from random yield fluctuations) we add 5 
percent additional acreage to reflect the absence of  acreage controls, 
giving output of 9.1 billion bushels. Thus the excess supply is 2.6  billion 
bushels. The 6.5 billion bushels were marketed at an average farm level 
price of $2.35 per bushel. The 9.1 billion bushels correspond to output 
at a producer price of $2.91, from earlier calculations. How much would 
prices have to fall to achieve a common producer and consumer price 
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timate of  elasticity of  demand as well as supply. Neither elasticity is 
known with precision, but a demand elasticity in the range  -.35 to 
-  .70 and a supply elasticity of.  15 to .40 seem defensible (see Gardner 
1986 or Lin  1986 for further discussion). The most  price-responsive 
elasticities, .4 and  -.7,  imply that price would have to fall to $1.87 
per bushel to clear the market. The least price-responsive elasticities 
imply that price would have to fall to $1 .28.4  The corresponding quan- 
tities at which production equals use are 8.0 billion bushels and 7.6 
billion bushels. The largest no-program quantity would occur with the 
more elastic demand and less elastic supply combination, in which case 
no-program output would be 8.4 billion bushels. 
For the whole range of assumptions, the quantity of corn produced 
in the absence of the corn program is less than the 8.6 billion bushels, 
given the 1985 program. Therefore, the Europeans seem to be correct 
in asserting that U.S. policy increases supplies and is expected to be 
world-price depressing. However, the CCC loan program must still be 
considered. The 6.5 billion bushels that go onto the markets at the $2.35 
supported  price  are less  than  the lowest  simulated  output with  no 
program. Therefore, because of the CCC loan program the European 
view cannot be sustained-the  three elements of U.S. price support 
policy taken together result in world prices higher than they would be 
if  the U.S. abandoned its programs. 
The preceding simulations pertain to the corn program of 1985. The 
story would be essentially the same for all the crops marketed under 
the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, that is, the 1982-85 crops. The 
biggest departure from the calculations would have occurred in  1983. 
Then the acreage reductions were larger, and U.S. policy was world- 
price supporting even without the CCC loan program. 
The situation is different in detail but qualitatively the same for the 
other exported feed grains-barley  and sorghum-as  well as for wheat, 
rice, and cotton. In each case the U.S.  loan program tended throughout 
1982-85  to support the world  price  by  diverting commodities that 
would otherwise have been exported or consumed domestically into 
CCC stocks. So there is no case for the programs through 1985 being 
world-price depressing. It is more nearly correct to argue, as many did, 
that U.S.  price supports were providing an umbrella under which other 
exporters could expand output at prices higher than would prevail in 
the absence of U.S. programs. Thus the commodity programs of the 
1980s must  have caused a decline in  the  share of  world grain trade 
accounted for by U.S. exports. In cotton, the United States was essen- 
tially  priced  out of  the market in  1985, as exports declined  from 6 
million to 2 million bales between the 1984-85 and 1985-86 marketing 
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The Food Security Act of  1985 
The 1985 Food Security Act, in effect since January 1986, is in some 
respects a response to the situation of  export depression and stock 
accumulation. The act reduces the loan rates and, moreover, introduces 
provisions  that completely divorce the loan rate from market prices 
for rice and cotton, and provide options for doing so in wheat and corn. 
The corn loan rate, for example, fell from $2.55 in  1985 to $1.92 per 
bushel for the 1986 crop (28 percent); the Gramm-Rudman budget re- 
duction legislation resulted in a further 4.3 percent cut. For changes 
in other commodities, see table 7.6. In the fall of  1986 and early 1987, 
the cash price of corn at Chicago was in the $1.50-1.60  range, about 
$1.00 lower than a year earlier. In real terms these prices are about 
one-fifth the corn prices of  1974-75  and are about half the levels of 
1969-71, before the commodity boom began. In cotton the percentage 
declines in market price were about the same, and in rice even larger, 
with  1986 prices about one-half the 1985 level. 
While the 1986 programs cut market support levels, this was much 
less a move toward market orientation than one might at first suppose. 
The target  prices  were left unchanged. Acreage controls were tight- 
ened. And export subsidy activities were intensified. 
Table 7.6  U.S. Support Prices in  1985  and  1986 
Type of 
Commodity  Support  1985  1986a 
Wheat  target 
Corn  target 
loan 
loan 
$ 4.38hu  $ 4.38 
3.30  2.40 
3.03  3.03 
2.55  I .92 
Soybean  loan  5.02  4.77 
Cotton  target 
Rice  target 
Milk  support 
loan 
loan 
81.0UAb  81.0 
57.3  ineffective 
$11.90/cwt  11.90 
11.60  11.20b 
8.00  3.60 minimum 
(after July 1) 
Sugar  support  18.  OUAb  18.0 
(attained via quotas) 
aGramm-Rudman-Hollings budget  reduction act results  in 4.3 percent cut in effective 
target prices and loan rates. 
bCCC support remains at $1 1.60, but a 40 cent per hundredweight producer assessment 
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Freezing the target prices while loan rates were cut meant big in- 
creases in deficiency payments. The payment in corn goes from $.48 
in  1985 to $1.11 per bushel in 1986. Moreover, farmers’ participation 
jumped from 69 percent to 83 percent of the acreage base. After Gramm- 
Rudman adjustment we still end up with about $6 billion to be paid on 
corn. In the case of rice, the target price is at $1 1.90 per hundredweight, 
and the  1986 program let the market price fall from $8.00 to about 
$4.00. Thus, government payments to rice producers will be about twice 
the market value of the rice crop. 
Keeping target prices up while cutting market prices makes the com- 
modity programs more like production subsidies, so the Europeans’ 
complaints  seem more appropriate in  1986 than  1985. And one can 
sympathize with the other rice exporters, notably Thailand, who, with 
a halving of the U.S. export price along with the depreciating dollar, 
face a much tougher marketplace. However, a complicating factor is 
that acreage controls were tightened in 1986. Plantings of  corn in 1986 
were down 8 percent from  1985, with wheat down 5 percent, rice 4 
percent, and cotton 10 percent. However, these cuts are probably not 
large enough to reduce production to no-program levels. 
Moreover, further steps were taken in 1986 that, coupled with loan 
rate cuts, place U.  S. policy indubitably in the world-price-depressing 
category. These steps involve the disposal of CCC stocks accumulated 
from past (1  982-85)  surpluses and the export subsidies that accompany 
this action. Carryover stocks of corn and rice are currently about one- 
half of a year’s production, and carryover stocks of wheat three-fourths 
of annual output. Cutting loan rates can prevent further accumulation, 
but existing stocks have to be pared down to economically appropriate 
levels. Since current production is not randomly large, nor is export 
demand high because of transitorily low production abroad, carryover 
stock levels that can be justified for stabilization purposes are probably 
quite low-no  more than 10 percent of normal production. Therefore 
it makes sense in terms of financial management by the government to 
dispose of some of existing stocks, even at aloss. The U.S.  government 
has been disposing of  stocks by using them in food aid, in payments 
in  kind to producers  to compensate program  participants  for  some 
acreage diversion, and to exporters as an in-kind subsidy. 
The Export Enhancement Program (EEP) is intended to be targeted 
specifically at markets into which the  EC has  sent subsidized  com- 
modities. Under this program, exporting companies can bid for sales 
to markets designated  by  the  secretary’  of  agriculture, undercutting 
competitors’ prices by amounts negotiated between the importer and 
the company. If the negotiated price is approved by the US.  Depart- 
ment  of  Agriculture, the  company receives  sufficient CCC grain  to 
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sale price and the prevailing U.S.  domestic price taken as the com- 
pany’s cost of grain exported. An example is shown in table 7.7 for 
wheat  sales to Morocco.  The availability of subsidies for 1.5 million 
tons of wheat sales to Morocco was announced in September 1985. In 
December 1985 and December 1986, deals were consumated as shown 
in table 7.7. Given the negotiated sale price and terms, the Department 
of Agriculture payment (“bonus”) varies according to  judgments about 
the loss the exporting company would incur if not compensated. The 
bonus is then paid in bushels of wheat from CCC stocks, valued at the 
U.S.  price deemed appropriate. The subsidy varies from sale to sale, 
averaging $22.56, or 20 percent of the average f.0.b. price. 
Overall, between  June  1985 and December  1986, sales under the 
EEP amounted to 7.3 million tons of wheat and flour, 1.5 million tons 
of barley,  17,750 head of  dairy cattle, and small amounts of rice, se- 
molina, and frozen poultry. The aggregate value of the commodities is 
$921 million, with CCC book value (an overstatement  of  the market 
value) of bonuses equal to $534 million. 
The effects of the EEP are difficult to estimate. Because the quan- 
tities subsidized are limited, and less than the total imports of the buying 
countries, it is doubtful that the program has added to consumption in 
these countries. Instead, the main consequence is an income transfer 
from U.S. taxpayers to whoever gets the right to buy at the subsidized 
U.S.  price and sell in favored importing-country  markets.  Since the 
subsidy does not add to consumption, to a first approximation, it does 
not change world prices even if it causes shuffling of export and import 
customers. But the release of CCC stocks to pay the subsidies, stocks 
that would otherwise be held off the market, must place some down- 
Table 7.7  Export Enhancement Program, Wheat Sales to Morocco 
Sale 
Date of  Type of  Quantity  Price  Terms of  Bonus 
Sale  Wheata  (tons)  ($/ton)  Saleb  ($/ton) 
12-30-85  HRW  120,000  131.50  c&f  20.60 
12-20-85  SRW  180,000  131.00  c&f  20.55 
1  -  17-86  HRW  200,000  113.50  fob  22.81 
1-17-86  HRW  wJoo  113.50  fob  22.81 
1-2  1-86  HRW  120,000  106.00  fob  25.38 
1-21-86  SRW  80 ,000  106.50  fob  24.95 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
aSRW is a soft red winter wheat; HRW is hard red winter wheat. (SRW has less than 
12 percent protein and is used in unleavened bakery products such as crackers; HRW 
has 8-15  percent protein and is used in bread making.) 
bC&f means priced at Moroccan port; fob means priced at U.S.  port. The roughly $18 
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ward pressure on world  market prices. These quantities are not  re- 
cycled into CCC stocks via new loans because the loan rates for the 
1986 crops have been cut while the release prices for previously ac- 
quired CCC stocks have not. 
Prospects for 1987 
The constellation  of  1986 programs-cutting loan rates, unloading 
stocks, and subsidizing exports-will  continue in  1987 and has real 
promise of  causing exports to rebound. The effects to date are most 
apparent in cotton, where exports from the 1986 crop are projected by 
USDA at triple the very depressed exports from the 1985 crop. USDA 
projects 1986 crop exports, as compared to 1985, to be up 30 percent 
for rice and 25 percent for wheat and corn (U.S. Department of  Ag- 
riculture  1986a). These estimates are quite uncertain, in that export 
projections  have  had  considerable error in  recent  years.  The grain 
export markets have remained weak and suggest that USDA may have 
been too optimistic. The sluggishness of exports, given that loan rate 
cuts and the dollar’s decline have reduced the price of  U.S. grain as 
seen by industrial-country importers by about half in the past two years, 
has led to criticism of the  1985 act and calls for changes in farm leg- 
islation. Congress is expected to consider several reforms in 1987. 
The main recent change in farm policy discussion bearing on inter- 
national trade is renewed interest in production controls. The 1985 act 
required that a nonbinding poll of  wheat producers be conducted on 
their  preference for a production control program.  To  the question; 
“Do you favor imposition of  mandatory limits on the production of 
wheat that will result in wheat prices that are not lower than 125 percent 
of the cost of production (excluding land and residual returns to man- 
agement)?”, 54 percent of 319,000 valid ballots said yes. Nonetheless 
it appears unlikely that such mandatory controls will be imposed. The 
1987 programs already announced use 1985-act authorities of the sec- 
retary of agriculture to idle an additional  15 percent of corn acreage 
and  maintain  acreage reduction  at  1986  levels for wheat, rice, and 
cotton. Hopes for farm price increases from production cutbacks that 
persisted for more than a year or two seem doomed because the demand 
for U.S. commodities abroad is too price-responsive. 
Attempts to move further toward market pricing by additional cuts 
in CCC price supports for corn or wheat have the great drawback of 
increasing budgetary costs, which are already seen as too high. With 
full participation by farmers, each  13 cent cut in the CCC loan rate 
adds $1 billion to government outlays through deficiency payments. 
Intensification of export subsidy efforts is another possibility that 
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targeted subsidies of  1985 and 1986 in expanding export quantities has 
also tarnished this approach (see U.S.  Department of Agriculture 1986b). 
The Reagan  administration  has  proposed  cutting target prices  10 
percent in  1988 from the 2 percent reductions scheduled in the  1985 
act.  This would  reduce  budgetary  costs and  begin  the phaseout  of 
supporting U.S. producer prices 50 percent to 100 percent above world 
market prices, a phaseout that economic efficiency will sooner or later 
require. But this step will be difficult for Congress. 
7.6.2  Policies Other Than Price Support Programs 
Although the commodity programs are the most important current 
determinant of  U.S. exports, other policies have also played a role. 
The export embargoes of 1973-80  continue to be controversial, as do 
food aid programs. More important than either for the future, however, 
may be multilateral agreement on agricultural policy and trade issues 
resulting from GATT negotiations. 
The Legacy of Embargoes 
The U.S. embargoed exports of soybeans in 1973, and in 1974,1975, 
and 1980 suspended grain sales to the Soviet Union. Congress in 1985 
enacted legislation requiring the Department of Agriculture to conduct 
a study to determine the losses to U.S.  farmers caused by past export 
embargoes. Since the last such embargo occurred five years previously, 
in a year during which U.S.  grain export quantities nonetheless reached 
their all-time high, this legislation shows the remarkable political strength 
of what would appear to be an economically minor event. The resulting 
study, listing as principal contributors more than twenty economists 
from universities across the country in addition to USDA staff, con- 
cluded that the embargoes were not a significant cause of the economic 
problems of U.S. agriculture in the  1980s (U.S. Department of  Agri- 
culture 1986b). Nonetheless, farm commodity groups expressed amaze- 
ment and the secretary of agriculture disavowed the study. 
Could the study have been so badly mistaken? The notion that there 
must have been significant effects has been well expressed by a spokes- 
man for the American Soybean Association: “four embargoes in eight 
years set up a trend. . . .  We  know our reputation as a reliable supplier 
has been injured”  (Washington Post, November 28,  1986). The best 
observable indicator of this phenomenon is that the U.S. share of Soviet 
grain imports dropped throughout the 1980s, until in the 1986-87 mar- 
keting year the Soviets have bought no U.S. grain. This plausibly re- 
flects a Soviet desire to reduce its dependence on the United States, 
encouraged by  the embargoes. However, it is far less clear that the 
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been caused by aversion to buying from the United States as opposed 
to other sources. Such aversion should show up as unwillingness to 
pay  as much for U.S.  grain  as for that from  other  sources; but as 
indicated earlier, U.S. prices in the mid-1980s have if anything tended 
to be premium rather than discounted compared to grain from other 
sources. Thus, the most accessible but inconclusive evidence suggests 
no significant lasting impact of the embargoes. More detailed investi- 
gations intended to sort out embargo effects from other events have 
reached the same finding. 
Export Subsidies via Surplus Disposal 
Going back to the P.L. 480 program initiated in the mid-I950s, the 
idea of  disposing of  surplus commodities by shipping them abroad at 
below-market prices has been a key element in farm commodity support 
efforts, especially for rice and wheat. 
Some information on concessional sales is presented in table 7.8. 
P.L.  480 exports have remained  quite constant over thirty years in 
dollar terms, meaning they have declined in real terms. Despite recent 
increased interest  in  these programs, they  still account for a much 
smaller percentage of U.S.  exports than they did in 1956-70. 
As is the case for the targeted export subsidies of  1985 and 1986, 
the effectiveness of these programs is questionable. The USDA  (1986b, 
1-20)  estimates that the subsidies necessary to cause an additional ton 
of U.S.  wheat exports would be larger than the cost of simply destroy- 
ing the wheat. Surplus disposal also has been criticized for reducing 
production incentives in other countries, which would tend to increase 
Table 7.8  Government-  Assisted Agricultural Exports (billions of  dollars) 
Percent of  All 
CCC Subsid-  Subsidized  Agricultural 
Fiscal Year  P.L. 480  ized Sales  Credit  Total  Exports 
1956-60  (ave.)  1.4 
I961 -65  1.5 
1966- 70  1.2 
1971-75  1.1 
1976- 80  1.4 
1981  1.5 
1982  1.2 
1983  1.3 
1984  1.5 





















2.5  61 
2.8  51 
2.9  45 
3.5  23 
2.7  9 
3.4  8 
2.7  7 
5.6  16 
5.4  14 
4.6  15 
Source: U.S. Department of  Agriculture. 
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demand for imports in these countries. But we do not have good evi- 
dence on these effects. 
In addition to their direct effects, these programs and the Export 
Enhancement Program discussed earlier have strategic aims. They are 
intended to increase the cost of other countries’ agricultural support 
prices. The particular aim is to increase the cost of the EEC’s export 
subsidies. The EEC pays the difference between its internal price and 
the world market price on the grain it exports. If U.S. policy cuts the 
world price by $30 per ton-and  the wholesale price of U.S.  corn has 
fallen by more than this in the past year-the  cost to the EEC is about 
$500 million based on their 1985 exports of  16 million tons. The EEP 
is intended strategically to force the EEC on a country-by-country basis 
to either match the U.S. sale price or abandon the market. Matching 
the EEP subsidies to date has not been nearly as problematical as the 
threat posed by the lower loan rates on grains. The biggest strategic 
success to date may well have been the EEC’s response to seeing the 
U.S. price of rice fall from $8.00 to $4.00 per ton in the spring of  1986; 
the contemplation of what would result from similar policies in wheat 
and feed grains is likely behind the increased willingness of EEC coun- 
tries to place agriculture on the GATT agenda, as discussed below. 
At the same time, the strategic risk exists of escalating retaliation. 
The lower feed grain prices resulting from 1986 programs pushed the 
Canadians to a finding that deficiency payments constituted an implicit 
export subsidy and a consequent retaliatory Canadian duty on imports 
of U.S. corn. The effects of this duty are quantitatively negligible, but 
illustrative of the risks in strategic action in trade policy. Another side 
of  the EEP subsidies is that the USSR, in reneging on its long-term 
agreement to buy U.S.  wheat and corn, gave as a reason for not buying 
in  1986-87  that the USSR could not get the subsidized prices while 
other countries could. 
Of  course, strategic action typically involves differences between 
stated and really intended plans, and between stated reasons and real 
reasons for what is actually done. The Canadian corn tariff issue must 
be considered jointly with U.S. hog producers complaints against im- 
ports of Canadian pork and the U.S.  International Trade Commission’s 
1986 finding (reversing an earlier decision) that Canadian timber sales 
policy amounted to an export subsidy on lumber. The possible addi- 
tional motives for the USSR’s decision are too tangled even to attempt 
to list. 
The  highest-profile  agricultural  trade  dispute  in  early  1987-the 
threatened U.S. tariffs on certain European wine, cheese, and related 
products-does seem independent of the 1986 U.S. policy initiatives, 
however.  The issue here is proper  U.S. compensation under GATT 
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they come under the EEC’s agricultural protection umbrella. This brings 
us to the general topic of agriculture and the GATT. 
Trade Negotiations  in Agriculture 
The demand for U.S. commodities has been reduced by other coun- 
tries’ protection of agriculture. Much of  the protection is consistent 
with the outcome of  trade negotiations under the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, and ironically it was at the insistence of the United 
States that agricultural exemptions to free trade principles were intro- 
duced. The United  States to the present  day relies on tight import 
quotas to maintain its sugar and dairy price  supports, in the former 
case achieving U.S. prices three to five times higher than world prices. 
In January  1987 the New York  offshore price of  raw  sugar was 6.5 
cents per pound while the New York domestic price was 21  cents. In 
the  1950s the United  States was concerned more generally with de- 
fending its grain and cotton price supports from imports at the support 
levels and so achieved a GATT waiver for import restrictions necessary 
to maintain domestic farm programs. 
Now that other countries make more use of import restrictions in 
maintaining domestic producer price protection, the picture is different 
from the U.S.  viewpoint. The United States sought and achieved in- 
clusion of  agriculture in the agenda for the upcoming round of GATT 
negotiations. Equally important, at the Tokyo Summit in May 1986 the 
leaders of the United States, Japan, France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom agreed that liberalization of  agricultural trade was desirable 
and that current trade problems were inseparable from the domestic 
farm policies of the countries involved. 
With respect to the developing countries, there is a risk that they 
may emulate the industrial countries and subsidize farmers in pursuit 
of food self-sufficiency. Dorosh and Pearson (1985) provide an inter- 
esting case study of Indonesia, and the World Bank’s World Devel- 
opment Report (1986) outlines others. It is evident that such policies 
can make comparative advantage irrelevant. If  Saudi Arabia can be- 
come a surplus grain producer, and it has, any country can. The ar- 
gument for trade is that self-sufficiency can be quite costly. Saudi Ara- 
bia pays producers about $25.00 per bushel for wheat, while the U.S. 
target price at $4.38 is too high (in the sense that U.S. producers would 
be willing to produce more than they do now at a lower price). 
The policy implication is that both the United States and other coun- 
tries could make themselves significantly better off by joint agreement 
to reduce their protection of agricultural commodities. The deadweight 
losses are not the small triangles that one finds for excise taxes because 
instead of 5 percent or 10 percent price distortions we have ones that 
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and dairy products. Tyers and Anderson (1986) estimate the net world- 
wide gains from liberalization of their seven agricultural commodities 
to be $40 billion. I have estimated that unilateral liberalization of the 
U.S. farm programs would cost U.S. farmers about $10 billion per year 
and benefit consumers and taxpayers by  $15 billion (Gardner  1986). 
Most of the $5 billion deadweight loss is the opportunity cost of idled 
land and losses on stored commodities (not the usual triangles). If other 
countries liberalized jointly with the United States, the costs to U.S. 
farmers would be less because world prices would be raised. 
While this could make U.S. liberalization more palatable politically, 
it is not in the cards at present despite the attention given to this year’s 
$25 billion budgetary cost of farm programs. Candidates of both major 
parties campaigned in  1986 with promises to do more for farmers; no 
candidate in any state promised to work to cut back farm supports; 
Congress, in its pre-election positioning, acted to increase, not to re- 
duce, farm program costs; and in the election itself the Democrats, 
who had promised farmers most, gained in both houses. In this climate 
the preliminary agreement to place agriculture on the agenda in the 
upcoming GATT negotiations is the only bright spot on either the do- 
mestic or international agricultural policy scene. Belated discussions 
between the United States and Canada and the United States and the 
EC have succeeded only in the limited sense of having prevented recent 
increases in agricultural protection from accelerating as rapidly as they 
have threatened to do. 
7.7  Conclusion 
Several hypotheses concerning the decline of  U.S. agricultural ex- 
ports  in  the  1980s  have been  discussed,  along with  some evidence 
bearing on them. The hypotheses that seem most important are (1) the 
slowdown in population and real income growth among importers and 
accompanying debt problems, (2) EC agricultural policies, (3) the rise 
in real foreign exchange value of the dollar, and (4) the U.S. CCC loan 
program. Recent events point to an improved export situation as far 
as (3) and (4) are concerned, but for (1) and (2) the prospects are less 
clear. Hypotheses that do not appear to be as important are expansion 
of  agricultural output in developing countries and the legacy of  past 
embargoes. However, there  are reasons  to believe  that agricultural 
protection and the rate of growth of developing-country output might 
accelerate (see Avery 1984 and references cited therein). And there is 
a real risk that more of these countries may choose to pursue food self- 
sufficiency. 
The outlook for world agricultural commodity markets and for the 
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observed to date, using world trading prices as a measure of market 
conditions, is that these prices will continue a random walk with down- 
ward drift in real terms of about one percent annually, punctuated by 
periodic “commodity  booms.”  Characteristic of the three booms ob- 
served in this century, roughly corresponding to World War I, World 
War  11, and  1973-76,  is the lack of a convincing explanation of why 
prices rose as much as they did in any of  them. In all three episodes, 
none of the supply and demand shift variables discussed in this paper 
contributes as much as dummy variables for the years in question to 
the explanation of  why prices rose above trend in those years. The 
economic picture for producers is a period averaging about twenty five 
years of  subsistence returns, irregularly interrupted by a few years of 
extraordinary profits. The position  of  U.S. agriculture in the future 
depends on trends in productivity and demand variables in the U.S. 
compared to the rest of the world, and on policies in the various coun- 
tries. It is difficult to be at all confident about any projection for either 
the economic or political events. The volume of agricultural trade will 
probably resume an increasing trend, as continuing economic devel- 
opment fosters specialization on a worldwide basis; but the U.S. share 
of  world agricultural production and trade could as well increase or 
decrease. It does seem unlikely that the U.S. share will decrease enough 
that its agricultural export volume will fall over time. 
The problem is that even if US.  export volume increases, but at a 
low rate, this will require a continuing shrinkage of  not only the agri- 
cultural labor force-which  is almost certain in any event-but  also of 
capital and land in  agriculture. Suppose that total factor productivity 
in U.S. agriculture continues to increase at about 2 percent annually, 
and domestic demand at 1 percent of U.S. production. This means that 
1 percent of  annual production must be added to agricultural exports 
each year to keep the current level of resources employed in agricul- 
ture. With one-fourth of output exported, this means that U.S. export 
volume must grow at 4 percent annually to fill  the gap (and exports 
must continue to increase as a fraction of farm production). This rate 
of increase in real export value has been achieved by the United States 
over the past thirty years. Although there are many plausible scenarios 
under which the rate of U.S. export expansion could be faster or slower 
in the next thirty years, the theory and evidence discussed in this paper 
are insufficient to provide a forecast. 
The implications of this uncertain situation for U.S. agricuitural pol- 
icy are that flexibility is required and that policies that would isolate 
the United  States from the world market are a nonstarter for either 
U.S. farmers or the overall national interest. Whatever the objectives 
of U.S. agricultural policy, the appropriate steps in pursuit of them will 
change as currently unpredictable events unfold. And for any policy 457  International Competition in Agriculture and U.S. Farm Policy 
that seeks to maintain a healthy farm sector over the long term, isolation 
is untenable because productivity trends imply that farm exports cannot 
simply be maintained but must grow unless the sector as a whole is to 
decline; yet if steps are taken to reduce U.S.  productivity growth, such 
as a cutback in biotechnical research, the United States will lose the 
export markets it still retains to countries in which agricultural pro- 
ductivity continues to grow. 
Appendix 
lslble 7.A.1  Indexes of  Agridturnl Production, 1955-85  (1976-78  = 100) 
All  Centrally 
Industrial  Planned  Developing  World 
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Notes 
1.  Percentage  changes in  this paper are calculated  as changes in  natural 
logarithms. The source of production data used in this section is primarily from 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture 1986a, 1986b, and 1986c. 
2. The land price rises were consistent with the expectations that land rental 
rates of the mid-1970s would continue forever, but these expectations are not 
possible to distinguish, in these data, from high rents existing for ten to fifteen 
years and then falling back. For evidence on U.S.  land prices and land rents, 
see Alston 1986 and Burt 1986, which follow up on Melichar 1979 and Feldstein 
1980. 
3. Construction of these indexes is tricky because of the existence of several 
exchanges rates, some in parallel markets, in some of the importing countries, 
and because of high  inflation rates that may not be measured accurately. For 
example, the value of the dollar against the countries that import U.S. wheat, 
weighted by each country’s share of U.S. sales, rose from an index value of 
85 in 1982 to 105 in 1985. But the nominal value of the dollar, before adjusting 
for inflation  rates, rose from 488 in  1982 to 11,841 in  1985 (U.S. Department 
of Agriculture 1986a). 
4.  The calculations are as follows. To  fit  the with-program  price-quantity 
points, the constant elasticity supply curve at the elasticity extremes must be 
Q., = 7.75 P,;I5  or Qs = 5.94 P,T.40,  where Q,?  is quantity produced and P,, is the 
producer price. The demand curves must be Qd = 8.77 Pd = 8.77 Pd-.35  or Qd 
=  11.8 Pd--’O- Finding equilibrium by  equating Q  =  Qd and P“  = Pd, the 
implied prices and quantities are as stated for the elasticity extremes. 
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2. H. B.  Atwater, Jr. 
From the Club of Rome to Agricultural 
Surplus: The Dramatic Reversal in World 
Agricultural Trade 
The dramatic reversal in world agricultural trade in the last ten years 
has confounded the predictions of grain traders and economic pundits 
alike. In the 1970s, world agricultural markets were booming. There 
was even a high level of hysteria that widespread starvation was in- 
evitable because production could never keep up with growing demand. 
By  1987 there had been a complete reversal of these trends, with heavy 
worldwide stocks of  grain and a slackening in world demand for ag- 
ricultural imports. In particular, the position of the United States as 
the dominant supplier has deteriorated rapidly and dramatically. 
I explore the factors responsible for the export boom of  the  1970s 
and the export bust of the 1980s. With that background, and bearing 
in mind the hazards of forecasting, I then talk very gingerly about the 461  International Competition in Agriculture and U.S. Farm Policy 
future direction of world agricultural trade and our political choices in 
the United States. 
The thesis I develop is that world agricultural markets have changed 
dramatically and will not return to their previous condition. The United 
States has gone from being the world’s largest net exporter of agri- 
cultural commodities to the point where we were a net importer for 
two months last year. I do not expect the United States will regain the 
position we enjoyed in world agricultural trade during the 1970s. Fur- 
thermore, we can no longer expect a large U.S. agricultural trade sur- 
plus to offset trade deficits in manufacturing and services. 
All the evidence in the 1970s would have sharply contradicted this 
thesis. International agricultural trade was growing rapidly, and most 
experts predicted continuing growth. For example, total world wheat 
imports grew by 71  percent from 1970 to 1980. Some other grains and 
commodities more than doubled their world imports from 1970 to 1980. 
The lesser developed countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America 
were major players in this import growth. Four factors stimulated LDC 
imports: first, rapid population growth; second, a deemphasis of  ag- 
ricultural development relative to urban industrial development; third, 
a belief that their mineral, oil, and industrial exports would be able to 
pay for a greater dependence on agricultural imports; and fourth, readily 
available debt in international financial markets, which they used, in 
part, to pay for agricultural imports. 
In addition to the LDC pressures for imports, the farm economy of 
Eastern Europe and Asia was in disarray, as poor weather, particularly 
in the Soviet Union, exacerbated the problems of command economies 
with few incentives for agriculture. 
Frightening projections of future supply and demand for food became 
the conventional wisdom. The Club of Rome issued a siren call noting 
the rapidly increasing growth in world population and predicting drastic 
shortages of  all raw  materials and commodities, including food, by 
1985. In 1974 the environmental fund issued a declaration on population 
and food, stating, “we have reached, or nearly reached, the limit of 
the world’s ability to feed even our present numbers adequately.”  To 
offset the terrible consequences of this anticipated world food shortage, 
books such as Frances Moore LappC’s Diet for a Small Planet urged 
us to eat grains and other complex carbohydrates rather than meats 
and heavily processed foods. Since it takes roughly seven pounds of 
grain to produce one pound of beef, a switch from beef to grain con- 
sumption in the richer countries of the world would free up food sup- 
plies which could be shifted to the starving and malnourished in the 
lesser developed countries. 
These concerns were not the mere doomsday prophecies of  well- 
meaning Cassandras: the prices of agricultural commodities and of the 462  Bruce L. Gardner/H. B. Atwater, JdJohn R. Block 
factors of production in agriculture were increasing substantially. Food 
prices were escalating dramatically in the United States, and, as a food 
marketer, I can well remember the consumer boycotts of supermarkets 
in cities across the United States during the mid-1970s. Grain prices 
were skyrocketing,  and the price  of farmland  was escalating.  Com- 
panies  in  the grain-trading business dramatically  expanded their in- 
vestment in barges, ships, and grain terminal facilities, as it appeared 
that continued increases in worldwide demand were inevitable. 
The United States was uniquely positioned to take advantage of the 
opportunity provided  by  expanding international  markets in agricul- 
ture. We  had the world’s best technological infrastructure, including 
superb internal  transportation, a system of  land grant colleges and 
agricultural  extension services, and plenty  of capital for agricultural 
investment. U.S. farmland was planted from fence row to fence row, 
and we moved aggressively, building our share of the world grain trade 
in the late 1970s to a position of such dominance that it enabled some 
to talk of the possibility of the United States exercising “green power” 
in a fashion analogous to OPEC’s exercise of oil power. 
All of this kind had a very positive effect on U.S. trade statistics. 
The U.S.  agricultural trade balance grew from a $1 billion  surplus in 
1960 to a $26.6 billion  surplus in  1980. Our very success in building 
our agricultural export business masked the fact that we were running 
an increasingly large trade deficit in manufacturing. Without the agri- 
cultural surplus, the U.S. trade account would have been in deficit for 
sixteen  of  the last  eighteen  years, instead  of  only  ten of those last 
eighteen. Our 1981 agricultural trade surplus of over $25 billion enabled 
the United States to report a current account surplus of $6.3 billion. 
The 1980s have witnessed a virtually complete reversal. The boom 
markets of the 1970s have stagnated worldwide as import demand for 
agricultural commodities slackened. World wheat imports, for example, 
increased by less than 7 percent over the first four years of the 1980s 
after growing by 71 percent over the previous ten years. Indeed, from 
1981 through 1983 there was no increase in the world volume of wheat 
imports. And this pattern is characteristic of many agricultural com- 
modities in the 1980s. 
The conventional wisdom of the impending global  catastrophe of 
world food shortages has been changed in the 1980s: now we live in 
an era of tremendous agricultural surplus. In mid-1986, for example, 
the stored grain surplus of the United States and EEC alone amounted 
to approximately  one-sixth  of  total  world  consumption, an amount 
considerably larger than the total volume of grain traded in international 
markets that year. 
As agricultural trade slowed and world stocks expanded, prices fell. 
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economy, with  numerous personal  bankruptcies,  failing agricultural 
banks, and the great distress of agricultural implement manufacturers 
and other agribusiness segments. 
This agony is compounded by the sharp deterioration of the position 
of  the United  States as principal world supplier. Whereas in  1981  a 
trade surplus of over $25 billion contributed to a current account surplus 
of $6.3 billion, by 1986 the United States had a current account deficit 
of more than $100 billion and an agricultural trade surplus of only $5.4 
billion. Furthermore, our share of world grain trade, which was over 
50 percent in 1980, had dropped to 34 percent by 1986. For every year 
from 1980 through 1986, the U.S. share of world grain exports declined, 
without  exception.  In the space of  seven years we  have gone from 
dominating world trade in agriculture to having a net deficit in agri- 
cultural trade for two months last summer. 
These are dramatic changes that mark an unprecedented  reversal. 
The question is What caused this dramatic reversal and what does it 
tell us about the future? And why has  the U.S. position  of  market 
dominance deteriorated so sharply in this stagnant, oversupplied in- 
ternational market? 
The most basic and important long-term cause has been the change 
in agricultural policies by the governments of countries that were tra- 
ditionally  major  agricultural  importers.  These  policies  have  trans- 
formed former importers into self-sufficient and, in some cases, ex- 
porting countries. As a result, world import markets have been reduced. 
The most important changes are in the lesser developed countries. 
Today, the conventional wisdom in many of these countries is that the 
key to economic development lies first in strengthening the agricultural 
sector of the economy. This is almost a complete reversal of  the sit- 
uation  in  the  1960s, when  most  development programs ignored  the 
agricultural sector entirely. The political leaders of LDCs are now rec- 
ognizing that the agricultural sector offers a number of important op- 
portunities not available in other parts of the economy.  Agriculture 
tends to be much more labor-intensive than manufacturing. Therefore, 
an investment in the agriculture sector tends to create more jobs. More 
jobs in rural areas means less urban crowding. Most lesser developed 
countries have found that the rush to the cities is a socially destabilizing 
process. Increases in the price of food in a highly urban economy can 
topple a government. Also, the necessary capital investments required 
for successful agricultural  development tend  to be  smaller than  the 
capital  requirements  for  manufacturing  development  projects.  Fur- 
thermore, many of  the roads and other infrastructure improvements 
required for agriculture also serve other segments of the economy. 
The recent World Development Report for 1986 issued by the World 
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changes could have. For instance, the introduction of market incentives 
for the production of  agricultural goods has had stunning results in a 
number  of  countries.  Chinese wheat production more than doubled 
over the last ten years, due to the introduction of market incentives. 
Technological changes  in  the  agricultural  sectors of  the  LDCs is 
another important policy-induced factor in increasing their self-suffi- 
ciency and reducing import demand. India has gone from being a coun- 
try plagued by food shortages and starvation to the point where it is 
now  a significant exporter  of  grains, particularly  wheat. While  the 
introduction of  new strains of wheat and similar “high  technology” 
efforts have been central to the success of India’s Green Revolution, 
the use of very simple technology has played an important role as well. 
Improvements in the transportation system and storage infrastructure 
have cut waste to 20 percent of production from its previous level of 
80 percent in the 1950s. 
The LDCs are no longer dependent upon the developed countries 
for agricultural technology. During the 1970s, LDC spending on agri- 
cultural research and development tripled. Further, the Office of Tech- 
nology Assessment, in a recent study, listed twenty-nine different tech- 
nical areas with at least a medium potential for significant productivity 
increases in  agriculture. In nine of  those areas, developing countries 
are playing a leading role. The OTA  also noted that the diffusion of 
existing agricultural technology was occurring much more rapidly than 
in the past. 
In a few countries, most notably Brazil and Mexico, the government 
has designed policies expressly to  foster the development of agricultural 
export sectors. This effort has been  spurred by  the massive foreign 
debt accumulated during the 1970s, which contributed to the expansion 
of the international agricultural market in that decade. Mexican pro- 
duction now accounts for more than 50 percent of the consumption of 
fresh fruits and vegetables in the United States during the winter months. 
Brazil, with the largest debt of all the third world countries, has ex- 
panded soybean exports so that they account for 12 percent of Brazil’s 
total foreign exchange earnings. 
Africa is the one part of the world that is a significant food problem 
area. There is great potential for the expansion of agricultural produc- 
tion in Africa, but the biggest stumbling block is the role of the African 
governments. With few exceptions, they have managed to effectively 
thwart any significant increase in agricultural production. Should they 
adopt constructive agricultural policies in their countries, as some are 
now beginning to do, they could easily become self-sufficient. This is 
made clear by the fact that “for the first time in more than a decade 
and a half, agricultural output in Africa in  1986 grew by more than 3 
percent-a  figure which  is  more  than  the population  growth rate,” 465  International Competition in Agriculture and U.S. Farm Policy 
according to the executive secretary of the U.N. Economic Commis- 
sion for Africa. 
Developed countries can also create major changes in agricultural 
trade. The EEC in 1970 was a substantial net importer of grains, with 
28 percent of net world imports. In 1985, by contrast, the EEC acounted 
for 10 percent of net total world exports of grains, in large part due to 
the production incentives built into the common agricultural policy. 
The special political position of the farm community in the United 
States has also worked to our disadvantage in agricultural trade. That 
special relationship  has been manifested for the past fifty years in a 
set of agricultural support policies that induce a degree of productive 
inefficiency: price  supports,  surplus storage programs,  and acreage 
reduction policies. While these pograms were largely irrelevant to U.S. 
export performance during the boom markets of the 1970s, their inef- 
ficiency-inducing effects may be quite significant for American com- 
petitiveness in a relatively sluggish and highly competitive world mar- 
ket in the 1980s. 
There are at least  two reasons  beyond the policy  considerations 
discussed above for the current stagnation in agricultural trade. First, 
the effects of the global recession in the early  1980s have not been 
overcome in  many parts of the world, and personal income growth 
rates have been  sluggish. This is especially relevant because of  the 
strong relationship  between  rising income and  increased  food  con- 
sumption in lesser developed countries. Current statistics show that in 
developing countries with annual per capita income above $1,250, food 
consumption is ten times greater than in those countries with incomes 
below $250 per capita. 
As per capita incomes increase, diets tend to be upgraded, switching 
from vegetable protein first to rudimentary baked goods and sugars, 
and then to meats and poultry. Obviously these kinds of consumption 
changes would create increased markets for feed grains and processed 
agricultural goods. 
A second factor has been the third world debt crisis. The heavily 
indebted countries have curtailed agricultural imports and have added 
aggressive export promotion policies in agriculture. For example, ef- 
fective January  1, 1987, Nigeria, which was the second largest pur- 
chaser of  American wheat, has banned all imports of wheat. In the 
past year and a half, Nigeria has banned imports of rice, corn, vegetable 
oil, and day-old chicks. The reason is simple-Nigeria  cannot afford 
to import food, given its huge debt service requirements. At indepen- 
dence in  1960, Nigeria was largely self-sufficient in  agriculture, and 
agricultural exports, such as cocoa, peanuts and palm oil, accounted 
for 70 percent of Nigeria’s total export earnings. In 1985, food exports 
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both peanuts and cooking oil. In response to these trends, Nigeria has 
set an extremely ambitious goal. It intends to make this nation of  100 
million people totally self-sufficient in food by the end of  1987. Once 
there, they intend to stay self-sufficient. 
Another example of  the  impact  of  the debt crisis in  the  1980s is 
provided by Argentina, whose total foreign debt equals 46 percent of 
its GNP. Argentina has expanded its agricultural exports by 43 percent 
in  volume in  an effort to meet its debt service requirements.  Costa 
Rica, while admittedly  not one of the major players in international 
markets, nevertheless also illustrates in interesting ways the impact of 
the debt crisis. Reprocessed coffee wastes, which are abundant in that 
country, are now being used to replace imported corn in the diets of 
cattle. Such innovations, born of  the fear of  additional international 
debt, can have a significant effect in reducing world demand for agri- 
cultural imports, when aggregated across many similar countries. 
An additional factor that put pressure on U.S. agricultural trade was 
the strengthening of the dollar between 1980 and 1985, which dramat- 
ically raised the price of our exports. Because this increase in the value 
of the dollar was substantial relative to almost all of the world’s cur- 
rencies, it gave a significant boost to the agricultural export promotion 
policies of  all  of  our principal competitors.  As  a result,  the United 
States lost some market share to many other exporters. The post-1985 
decline in the value of  the dollar has been great relative only to our 
major industrial trading partners; the value of the currencies of some 
of our primary competitors in international agricultural markets, such 
as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, and Canada, has remained relatively 
low. 
The United States has also been hurt by the perception that we are 
an unreliable supplier. This was an outgrowth of the U.S. grain em- 
bargoes, which not only opened the door to new suppliers, as in  the 
case of Brazil and soybeans, but also destabilized established customer 
relationships as with the Soviet Union. These agreements are only now 
beginning to be reestablished. 
Finally, the increasingly intense, subsidized agricultural trade war 
being waged with the EEC is hurting our exports. Last August the 
European community offered butter on international markets at a price 
that was 3 percent of the  EEC’s cost to purchase  it. The Common 
Agricultural Program is inducing budget crises in the EEC, but for a 
number of domestic reasons-particularly  the special political position 
of farmers, notably in France-it  is not clear that they will abandon 
this subsidized trade policy. 
While U.S. agricultural trade will not return to the booming situation 
of the 1970s, conditions can be made better than they are now. There 
is not a single and simple solution, but a package of reforms on several 
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First, the long-term special political position of the farm community 
in  the United  States must be transformed.  The agricultural  support 
policies that have been in place for the past fifty years are not working 
now, except as a restraint on our international competitiveness. 
The United States needs to replace governmental incentives for pro- 
duction with market incentives. The return on investment for farmers 
varies dramatically with the size of their farm, the level of sophistication 
of  the farmer, the kind of job the farm represents-full  time or part 
time-and  the cost of the major capital factors of land and equipment. 
In other words, farmers with reasonably priced capital inputs are mak- 
ing money at farming even with today’s prices.  Small farms, hobby 
farms, and farms with high-priced assets and heavy interest burdens 
are in terrible financial shape. Rather than spending $26 billion to sup- 
port farm prices for an existing farm, farmers who cannot compete in 
the new environment must be helped to move to new employment. 
We must avoid the temptation to take large quantities of agricultural 
land out of production by paying farmers for acreage set-asides. This 
delivers  money  to the wrong hands and slows down the necessary 
process of having inefficient farmers leave agriculture. Furthermore, it 
has the potential of dramatically raising prices for American consumers 
and absolutely pricing us out of export markets without heavy export 
subsidies. Congress will not easily give up its special relationship with 
agriculture, but long-term prospects for America’s role in international 
agricultural trade are rather dim if  it does not. 
Second, as a step toward reinvigorating the international agricultural 
markets, the United States should do its part to spur world economic 
growth, especially in the third world. As much as anything, this prob- 
ably means avoiding the increasingly strong temptation in Congress to 
impose import restrictions on manufactured goods from the newly in- 
dustrialized countries of the third world and more vigorously attkmpting 
to reduce our government budget deficit, which annually drains some 
$200 billion of potential investment finances out of the world economy. 
Healthy world economic growth will not resume without a resolution 
of the debt problems of the lesser developed countries. 
Lastly, the United States needs urgently to resolve its growing ag- 
ricultural trade war with the EEC. International agricultural markets 
have been  more  subject to governmental intervention than virtually 
any other international economic sector. The consequence is a very 
expensive and market-distorting burden for the world’s consumers and 
taxpayers. We  must move now to the bargaining table to negotiate joint 
reductions in the level of subsidization of agricultural exports. 
While the seemingly endless “good times” of the 1970s will not return 
to agriculture, both the United States as well as individual American 
farmers must be able to profit from participation in international ag- 
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cultural programs so that they reflect the realities of international mar- 
kets. U.S. policies must help move the domestic agricultural sector to 
become an effective competitor in the new world agriculture scenario. 
3.  John R. Block 
Food Policy in an Evolving World Marketplace 
I speak from personal experience because I  have spent a lifetime in 
agriculture. I was born and raised on a farm and have lived the agri- 
culture industry from a tractor seat to the cabinet room, and seen a lot 
of things happen-some  of them good and some of them not particularly 
good. 
If  you look back to the year  1700, one farmer was feeding three 
people, only three. By the year 2000, one farmer in the United States 
will be feeding more than a hundred people.  When I was a boy, we 
had two old horses called Bert and Bill, and my sisters and I milked 
ten cows with my father, by hand, morning and night. And those old 
horses pulled a two-row corn planter. It took a long time to plant the 
corn under those conditions. 
Today we have a farming operation of  seven people. Those seven 
people are producing  ten  thousand  head  of  hogs a  year,  and three 
thousand acres of corn and soy beans. Not only is the operation vastly 
different today, but it is a capital-intensive business. Then it was much 
more labor-intensive. But also the things you talked about and look 
toward were entirely different. 
As a boy we would bale the hay in the afternoon and, with the hay 
put away, would sit around visiting with the neighbors. The men were 
always talking about the weather and a host of things, but they never 
talked about the international market place. They did not talk about 
the strength of the dollar; they did not talk about penetrating the Soviet 
market and sending another million metric tons of wheat into the Soviet 
Union; they did not talk about any of those things because we had an 
industry that was labor-intensive.  It was national, and in some cases 
even regional and local, in scope. 
We  bottled our own milk in the basement and took it and sold it in 
my  grandfather’s store. We  gathered the eggs and took them to town 
and sold them in his store. It is certainly not like that today. 
Agriculture  is  a global industry.  And  for the most  part,  this has 
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percent of the people in this country lived on farms. Today 2 percent 
live on farms. Even more important, of that small percentage who live 
on farms and farm, 14 percent of the farmers produce 75 percent of 
the farm production. 
As Bruce Gardner pointed out, when we went into the 1970s, the 
world market exploded. Earl Butz was out selling grain everywhere, 
all  around  the world,  and  the expectations  were just unbelievable. 
Those expectations carried forward to the day I went to the office of 
secretary of  agriculture.  Just two months before I  stepped into that 
chair, the Wall Street Journal, on November 28, 1980, was telling the 
world: “Big increases in food prices loom as world demands more U.S. 
grain. U.S.  can no longer be a bread basket to the world. Food will be 
in the 80s what oil became in the 70s. Scarce and expensive.” It goes 
on and on, and the situation we know does not resemble anything in 
that article. Itjust shows how the whole country and the whole industry 
and the whole world was caught up in  these expectations; it is no 
different from people who thought we would see $100 a barrel of  oil. 
The high-price incentive brings on more production, regardless of what 
it is, and the whole thing collapsed as we went into the 1980s. 
In the agricultural industry, prices plunged, and land values declined. 
Frankly they were in a free-fall in the early part of the 1980s, but they 
have started to change a little bit now. You  sit in the Cabinet Council 
of Economic Affairs and the cabinet room and you wish you could get 
your hand on the handle to straighten it out. But there is no handle to 
pull. Because the handle is all  wrapped up in international macroeco- 
nomic policies. And no one really understands what those policies are. 
So you have got all these problems to deal with, with a strong dollar. 
Bruce Gardner pointed  out that the ability of  our customers to buy 
products from us collapsed, the European economic community turned 
into a big exporter, and they are subsidizing exports all over the world 
because they have to get rid of them too-they  don’t know what to do 
with the stuff. We  have a farm program in place that was put in place 
in 1981; it, unfortunately, is designed in a way to encourage production. 
It provides for an escalating support price, escalating target prices, 
targets and supports that everyone in the world shot for because they 
knew they were guaranteed. One of the things we have to fix is a farm 
program that is not related to the conditions of the day. That means 
lowering supports, and you know how  many people  want to lower 
supports under those conditions. That is the kind of situation we wrote 
the 1985 farm bill under, I might add. 
Of  course not all farm commodities are given these direct supports. 
In fact, in dollar terms, more than half of  our commodities are not 
supported this way. They may have some indirect support, however. 
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supported, but all the meats and all the special crops are unsupported. 
Meats of course get an indirect support because they rely on the grain 
that must be fed to the animals. 
The 1985 farm bill did some good things. We  lowered the loan rate 
dramatically so that we did not have that guarantee to our farmers and 
the rest of  the world that the price was always going to be high. In 
Bruce Gardner’s paper, table 7.6 really shows how the loan rate came 
down. In some cases it needs to come down still more. Prices in some 
cases are about half what they once were. 
Where are we today? I will talk a little about our domestic farm 
programs, because you cannot divorce domestic policy from trade policy. 
Our domestic policies impact Europe. European domestic policies 
impact the  Caribbean because  they are dumping sugar all  over the 
world, depressing the price of sugar. Frankly, they would not be able 
to compete if they had to do it on an open market. But farm programs 
in different countries are impacting everyone else in the world. 
American agriculture is starting to stabilize somewhat, after being 
in a free-fall since about 1981 or 1982. Land values, although declining, 
are not declining as fast today. Exports, in.terms of  dollar sales and 
especially in terms of  volume, look like they may be starting to turn 
back up again. 
The United States is using a host of  subsidy programs to penetrate 
markets and to pressure the European community into abandoning their 
farm policies that have been disastrous for us and a lot of other countries. 
And we are using our surpluses to push product into the market. 
We’ll sell something, and then we’ll give them a little extra wheat so 
they’ll have a good deal, and we’ll be able to sell more product that 
way. We are zapping countries all over the world. We are taking markets 
away from Argentina by selling beef to Brazil. We  took sugar markets 
from Australia by  selling sugar to China. We  have everyone in  the 
world angry at us for what we are doing. So we are successful in getting 
the world’s attention that agricultural subsidies are a world problem. 
When you look at the rest of the world, a very important point is 
the battle cry for food self-sufficiency. I think it is going to have a big 
impact. It is already starting to. 
I saw the sands of Saudi Arabia green with wheat. They should not 
have been raising any wheat there at all, but Saudi Arabia is now a net 
wheat  exporter. They are an exporter of  wheat  which is absolutely 
insane. They are paying their farmers a thousand dollars a ton to pro- 
duce, raise,  and  sell wheat.  I  could raise wheat on this floor for a 
thousand dollars a ton and make money. 
But it is a fact of life-there  is a battle cry for food self-sufficiency. 
But wanting it is one thing; knowing how to achieve it is another. Many 
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is the way to get it done. Let the prices rise and then technology will 
flow, and they will produce more food as time goes on. 
Technology is flowing now. You get farm people complaining that we 
are transferring our technology to other countries so they can compete 
against us. I don’t buy that. We  do some of  that, but technology just 
plain flows. Technology is for sale. It is for sale because  we  are a 
country of private companies. 
I went to Hungary a year and a half ago to visit their agriculture 
experiment station-the  most beautiful corn you have ever seen outside 
of corn in Illinois. What do you think those experiment station people 
were wearing. They were wearing Pioneer caps, all of them. And that 
is in Hungary. You can find similar examples everywhere. Technology 
transfer is occurring. 
Finally, the other agricultural exporting countries in the world are 
feeling a pinch like the United States. In Europe, in many cases, the 
price of product in real terms has gone down. Their budgets are being 
taxed to the limit; they are trying to find more revenue to keep their 
supports in place; and land values have declined, in France in particular. 
I have read reports that in Australia, with these lower prices, which 
is a disincentive to produce wheat in Australia, that by year 1991 their 
acres in wheat production will be about half what they were at their 
peak in  1981  or 1982, unless  they  turn  around the policies.  And in 
Canada, they are cutting their acres for corn because the prices are 
not as attractive as they once were. This tells us that these lower prices 
are working. But it takes a while for them to work, to put this disin- 
centive through the whole system. 
I suggest that the 1985 farm bill will not be changed very much. There 
is a lot of talk of wild-eyed ideas, like Senator Harkins’ supply man- 
agement, but the closer the proponents of that idea get to it, the more 
they are going to run away from it like the plague. It would raise the 
cost of food dramatically, and politically it is an untenable position.  I 
am  amazed at Gephardt.  I am  not  amazed at Harkins.  That  is his 
populist mentality, but I can not imagine why Gephardt signed on to 
tbat kind of approach. I say it is not going to happen. 
The administration’s dramatic cuts are not going to happen either, 
this year, because politics will not allow it. 
The longer-range solution to the farm problem should involve what 
they popularly talk about as decoupling, as promoted by Senators Bos- 
chwitz and Boren. This solution really says, let’s see which farmers 
receive subsidies, let’s figure out about how much they were getting, 
and let’s just give them those subsidies.  We’ll  give them a little less 
each year, but we won’t ask them to do anything. You  don’t have to 
cut production; you can go down to the breakers and enjoy the weather; 
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That is a good solution because it buys farmers off of this kick of 
being on the dole of the farm program. And in the final analysis the 
farmer will start responding to market signals. The key to it is not to 
have any production requirements placed on the farmer. Let him raise 
what he wants, whatever he wants. 
The time for that approach has finally arrived. Farmers argue that it 
is a welfare-type program. Well, call it what you like-I  call it a tran- 
sition program to get out from under the heavy hand of government. I 
think something like that will be written into the next farm bill, but it 
is not due to be written until 1990. Maybe they will write it before then, 
but Congress never does anything until it has to. It won’t write a new 
farm bill until the old one expires. 
The rules for trade in agricultural products are going to be written 
or not written with these GATT talks that we talked about before. It 
is important that agriculture have a priority there. Writing new rules 
is going to be enormously difficult because countries are still providing 
a great many special privileges to agriculture. All over the world, there 
is no industry that has been given this kind of special consideration. 
In my judgment, agriculture should not be given special treatment in 
the world, especially in the developed countries. It should take its place 
alongside other businesses and industry in the world economy since it 
is a global industry  today. But to break away from these old ties of 
special support will not be easy. I am optimistic that, given the kind 
of change we have seen in our lifetimes in trade and agricultural, in 
the next twenty years we will see more dramatic changes, where many 
of these national borders will melt away or diminish. And hopefully 
the tension in the world will diminish as trade tends to increase, and 
we will have a little safer place in the world. 
I will close my remarks by quoting a few words that have to do with 
food diplomacy, agriculture,  and the food industry as the foremost 
diplomatic tool in  world  affairs.  In fact this quote shows beyond a 
shadow of a doubt that food and agriculture are the foremost diplomatic 
tool.  This is a letter written  to a newspaper in my state of Illinois. 
Peoria, Illinois, How does it play in Peoria? Well, this was written to 
a Peoria newspaper. “I saw a newspaper picture of the Soviet Minister 
of Agriculture holding a pig while standing next to U.S.  Secretary John 
Block who was also holding a pig. A year ago I saw another picture 
of the President of France and Block, holding pigs, during a visit to 
Block’s Illinois farm. Obviously I’m missing something because I don’t 
understand this. Can you help me.” 
The newspaper writes back: “Not really. For reasons that not even 
the State Department understands, whenever foreign dignitaries arrive 
in the United States, they immediately ask if they can hold a pig with 
John Block. It’s  simply one of those international  mysteries. It’s pig 
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Summary of  Discussion 
John  Block  explained  the apparent contradiction between  the huge 
increase in federal farm payments and the desperate shape of so many 
farmers: most of  the money passes through the hands of the farmers 
on to their bankers. The real question, he said, is how we got to where 
we are. He proposed that under the scenario given in a 1980 Wall Street 
Journal article that predicted food shortages in the 1980s, the programs 
as designed would not have been so expensive. ,la the seventies the 
same types of programs worked reasonably well, since the farm econ- 
omy stayed ahead of the support prices. The 1985 farm bill represents 
some improvement, since the lowering of the loan rate makes agricul- 
ture more competitive  in world markets, although the outlay is still 
enormous since the difference was made up with direct payments to 
farmers. Obviously, farmers have enormous clout in Congress. 
Bruce Atwater attributed the special treatment of farm debtors to 
the strength of the farm block. When small farms approach bankruptcy, 
there is significant political reaction; when small industrial companies 
borrow too much, prices fall, and they approach bankruptcy, there is 
not a similar political reaction. Government lending agencies were en- 
couraging farmers to borrow in the late seventies, since the petrodollars 
had to be recycled  and agriculture was considered to be a sector of 
comparative advantage. James  Schlesinger added that Iowa has  an 
early presidential primary. 
Block saw little cause to predict rapid change in the strength of farm 
interests, pointing out that it is especially difficult to change a program 
that is already in place. He added that while there are relatively few 
farmers, rural America, which is closely related to farm America, is 
very important, since 25  percent  of Americans are rural, as are 75 
percent of governmental units and 90 percent of natural resources. He 
predicted  nonetheless that we have seen the high water mark for ag- 
ricultural outlays both in the United States and Europe. The fall in the 
dollar helps, as does the effect of the 1985 farm bill on export prices, 
and while Japan says it will be self-sufficient in rice at any cost, it will 
be importing in ten years. Block noted that it is a myth that the family 
farm will disappear. Almost all farms are and will be family farms. 
Several discussants speculated on the fate of the EEC farm policy. 
Schlesinger suggested that the EEC situation will fall apart when the 
Left takes over in the United Kingdom and Germany, as the support 
for the current conservative governments is very rural, and the high 
domestic food prices will not be tolerated, particularly at an exchange 
rate of one DM to the dollar. Atwater disagreed, citing the support of 
the French government for the current agriculture policy and the proag- 
ricultural implications of  the addition of  Spain to the community and 
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the European common agricultural policy (CAP) would encounter trou- 
ble due to budgetary issues within the community, and remarked that 
the French generated only token flack about the 1986 World Bank World 
Development Report, which was critical of aspects of  the EEC farm 
policy. 
The prospects for a large contribution of U.S. agriculture exports to 
the resolution of the trade imbalance were discussed by several people. 
Block reported the forecasts of the National Association of Food Pro- 
ducers, which projected an increase of  food  exports in  volume (64 
percent) and value (42 percent) by 1991. He expressed less bullishness 
but  agreed  that  exports  would  recover, and predicted  that  imports 
would increase at a slower pace. He noted that the prospects for serious 
discussion of agriculture at GATT are good since current U.S.  policy 
of  stealing markets from the EEC and LDCs has created a desire in 
these countries for some rules on trade in agriculture. 
Bruce  Gardner  tempered this  optimism with  the remark  that the 
striking aspect of the trend in per capita food production since the mid- 
1970s is not so much that the rate of increase in food production has 
gone up but that the rate of population growth has slowed. The rela- 
tionship of  this trend to income growth is the key to an increase in 
food  exports;  since little  can  be  done to change it, at least  in  the 
remainder of the 1980s, this is gloomy news for agricultural exports. 
Krueger saw hope for U.S. agricultural  exports in  the immanent 
changes in EEC policy, in the prospective takeoff of Japan and Korea 
as food importers, and in the importance of  the dollar exchange rate 
in agricultural trade. She noted that while macro forecasts often turn 
out to be self-fulfilling, micro forecasts are generally the reverse of the 
truth. 
Jack Sawyer suggested that economists not ignore questions of  po- 
litical economy. For example, on the issue of competitiveness, much 
of  the current discussion  is couched in overly general language. He 
wondered if  some politically useful ideas about entitlement programs 
could not be framed in terms of consumption subsidies and savings 
incentives. Peter Peterson predicted an eventual revolution against the 
entitlement constituencies, but pointed out that currently there is no 
sign of  this. A modest proposal to reduce the COLA frequency from 
twice to once per year generated armfuls of negative mail, for example. 